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Abstract
Since 1979, Saudi-Iranian relations have been tense due to their position as
superior powers in the Middle East. Both countries have different values and perspectives
in regards to diplomatic relations with the West. As a consequence of the new
developments in Iran’s foreign policy and the newfound openness to the West adopted by
President Rouhani, the topic has proven to be of research interest. The primary concern of
this research was to explore the effect of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran in
the Middle East, and whether or not there is a possibility to overcome this conflict using
the new political developments. For this purpose, a content analysis methodology was
employed.
Through an analysis of data presented in the literature review, which consisted of
scholarly articles, policy briefs, and books, this dissertation examines the complex
political relations through which the pattern of the bilateral relations explain the
conflicting narratives. This complexity is present in the political actions taken by Iran and
Saudi Arabia, as well as the domestic and foreign policies they are embracing. The
findings of this study demonstrate the effect of this conflict in the Middle East. The
research also proposes a number of possible recommendations on how to resolve this
conflict through political openness and reciprocal agreements that target the citizens of
Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Keywords: conflict, Iran, Saudi, foreign policy, reform, economy, Middle East, security
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1
Chapter 1: Introduction
For this study the researcher will examine both the Iranian and Saudi Arabian
options of being a superior power in the Middle East and the conflict this race to the top
causes. Superior power—being the political and Islamic leading country in the region—
has caused tension to grow between these two countries. The tense relationship between
Saudi Arabia and Iran increased as a result of Iran’s subversion of the Arabian
governments, especially Gulf governments that have a great number of Shi’ite minorities
in their populations (Abir, 1997). Saudi Arabia plays a major role in the Arab and Islamic
world This important and special position is a result of several factors including its
location, its role in promoting inter-Arab relations, its initiative role in establishing the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and finally, its spiritual importance for all Muslims
around the world for having the two holy mosques in Saudi (Alnasrawi, 1991).
Both countries value the idea of being the center point of the Islamic world and
the Middle East. Iran and Saudi Arabia are not allies. Each country has different values
and each of their governments has different values for relationships with the Western
world. On the one hand, there is Iran’s perspective towards the West which changed with
the introduction of a new policy after the Iranian revolution; Ayatollah Khomeini Iran’s
first Supreme Leader adopted an anti-Western and anti-shah strategy (Tazmini, 2012).
Iran’s position after the revolution has been described as the government’s reaction
towards ‘West-toxication’, because Iran signifies the post-revolution time as the era
where religion will demolish the holocaust of West-toxication (Tazmini, 2012, p. 21). In
contrast, Saudi Arabia has been a close ally to the United States since 1974. More
recently in November 2013, John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, visited Saudi Arabia.
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During this visit Saud Alfaisal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered a speech
clarifying and stressing that Saudi-U.S. relations remain strong and stated that true
friends base their relationships on openness and transparency. This visit came after some
rumors circulated about conflict between these two countries suggesting that the
relationship was at a dramatic critical stage. Alfaisal also clarified that Saudi Arabia’s
decision to decline joining the United Nations Security Council did not mean its
withdrawal from the United Nations (“Akkad anna aletizar,” 2013).
The Saudi-Iranian relations have always suffered from tension and conflict;
religion was the conflict escalator as Wahhabi and Shiite leaders fueled this battle. While
Mohammad Bin Badulwahhab views Shiite as the apostate of true Islam, Abdulawahhab
was the attack leader on the Alhussain memorial in Iraq which is a very important
religious place for the Shiite doctrine. From that time tension never rested, and according
to the current circumstances, it will remain in this condition for the time being because
the rulers of Saudi Arabia and Iran acted as competitors more than friends. Whereas
Iranian leaders after the 1979 revolution have always brutally criticized the Islamic
legitimacy of Saudi Arabia, Iran did not rely on verbal criticism on Saudi Arabia alone. It
also planned to fly war aircraft over the country during the Iranian Iraqi war, menaced
tanker traffic into Saudi Arabia to put pressure on Saudi Arabia for its support to Iraq,
and incited violent unrests during the Islamic pilgrimage season in Makkah. For these
mentioned facts, Saudi Arabia has always maintained its political and diplomatic
relations with Iran; it kept its relation without neglecting the threat from Iran and tried to
find ways to reach a settlement with Iran. These efforts started to work after the death of
Khomeini; during the Rafsanjani presidency, improvements started to take place. The
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Iranian government represented by its Foreign Minister , Ali Akbar Velayati, made
speeches about improving relations between the both countries. And Saudi Arabia reacted
positively to all speeches (Cordesman, 2003).
Since the establishment of the Saudi government and the Republic of Iran, the
Palestinian case has been supported by both states. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue is
so sensitive that it has greatly affected U.S.-Saudi relations. The United States’
continuous support of Israeli expansions has put Saudi Arabia in a problematic situation
in the Arab world. Due to this problematic situation, Saudi Arabia has adopted a foreign
policy in the Arabian region based on three elements: 1) oil and political decisions are
distinct because oil should never be used as a tool for political burden; 2) the Saudi
government has always portrayed their position on the U.S. foreign policy in the Arab
region as needing modification; and 3) drawing from Saudi oil revenues, Saudi Arabia
has always provided grants to Arab countries in need. These grants are used to guide their
political policy in accordance with the Saudi and American foreign policy in the region
(Alnasrawi, 1991).
In contrast, Iran provided support to Palestine, and an anti-Israeli policy was
executed. During the Khomeini presidency, while the Iraqi-Iranian war was active, the
Iranian government did not neglect the Palestinian case and provided limited funding to
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) group, Hamas, as well as to the secular leftist Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFL-GC). President
Rafsanjani’s anti-Israeli policy took on a different character, however, as he made many
efforts to communicate with Western governments by showing acceptance of any
Palestinian decision even if was the two-state solution, though this position was not
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announced publicly (Mattair, 2008). “For Israelis, Iran has become their bogeyman. It is
almost universally seen as the country’s greatest enemy and biggest threat” (Waxman,
2012, p. 79).
This study should be of interest to both the Iranian and Saudi governments
because it examines one of their most important matters. The problem under investigation
has been an issue since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The Islamic Republic of Iran has
always been a threat for Saudi Arabia and vice versa. Moreover, there has been an
ongoing silent contest between both countries throughout the past three decades (Sadeghi
& Ahmadian, 2011). The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been of interest to
politicians on both sides as it has affected local security in Saudi Arabia many times
during the season of Hajj (Sadeghi & Ahmadian, 2011).
By the year 2011 Saudi Arabia was an Iranian target as a result of the Kingdom’s
support of the government of Bahrain. Saudi Arabia alleged that the unrest in the Eastern
province of the Kingdom was assisted by a foreign country. Analysts and news
commentators argued that Saudi Arabia was blaming Iran for those attacks (Black, 2011).
It is not only an issue of competition between these countries; it also affects the security
of both states.
The challenges for Iran and Saudi Arabia have been discussed based on security
criteria, but the researcher plans to take it to a step further in order to clarify future
options based on a scholarly examination of past facts and current situations in order to
reach a peaceful state between Saudi Arabia and Iran. It might help result in a new
political era with new cooperations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The goal of this
research is to understand possible future options for both countries as they compete
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against each other in being a superior power in the Middle East. Further, the research can
contribute to the field of conflict analysis and resolution as it seeks a new option for
political cooperation for these two powerful countries instead of the continuous conflict.
Statement of Problem
The conflict of hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia causes serious security,
political, and economic problems. For Saudi Arabia the security threats from Iran are the
same as that of all the remaining Gulf countries. Iran is a political and ideological threat
for Saudi Arabia because it does support the Saudi Shiite minorities, Iran’s military and
capabilities growth, and Iran’s negative position from the existence of the U.S. forces in
the Gulf States (Alam, 2001).
While Iran has other fears concerning security threats, these threats are mainly
caused by U.S. interference associated with the growing presence of U.S. forces and
military bases in the GCC, and the involvement of extraterritorial forces in the security of
the region (Alam, 2001). Since the Iranian Revolution, Iran has been an asymmetric
ideological threat to Saudi Arabia, and the conflict between these two nations extends to
its foreign policy with neighboring countries including Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain,
Yemen, and, Syria.
Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapon does not create a direct threat to Saudi
Arabia, yet it will encourage Iran to act more aggressively in these conflicted countries.
In the Gulf region, Saudi Arabia acts as a strategically important member, but if Iran has
its own nuclear system, this position will be a threat for Saudi’s superiority in the region
(Wehery, 2012).
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According to Blockmans and Waizer (2013), Iran has been facing economic
hardship due to ten years of sanctions, and especially after the latest EU sanctions that
were directed at Iranian’s oil industry. “Oil revenues make up 50-60% of the
government’s total revenues. In 2011 oil-related materials constituted 92.4% of the
country’s total exports to the EU and 80% of its worldwide exports” (Blockmans &
Waizer, 2013, p.2). The European embargo aimed to stop financing the government but
avoid striking the population of Iran. India, China, Japan, and South Korea continued to
import oil from Iran, but these sales still did not make up for the loss of revenues as a
result of the EU embargo because of Iran’s fleet tank capacity and the small guarantee
coverage paid by Indian insurance companies. “Iranian net oil revenues went down by
50%, from $100 billion in 2011 to approximately $50 billion in 2012” (Blockmans &
Waizer, 2013, p. 4). This decline in Iranian’s oil price increasingly affected the
unemployment rate, inflation, and prices of goods.
All of the aforementioned factors which fueled the cold war between Saudi
Arabia and Iran should be addressed in order to determine whether or not this conflict
over hegemony is affecting their roles as powerful nations and positive factors in the
Middle East. Researchers have focused their work on this issue, and there is a significant
amount of data analyzing the reasons behind the conflict since the Iranian Revolution.
However, in this study the researcher will shift the focus to examine the critical factors in
this conflict as it might be inhibiting the roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran as positive nations
in the Middle East.
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Statement of Purpose
This qualitative, content analysis research will examine and analyze the critical
factors in Saudi Arabia and Iran which may be inhibiting their positive roles in the
Middle East due to their hegemonic conflict. Data sources will include scholarly articles,
policy briefs, and books. The first objective is to find whether the conflict of hegemony
between Saudi Arabia and Iran is affecting both countries from being positive players in
the Middle East region. The second objective is to examine this conflict through the
lenses of politics, religion, social factors, economics, and weapons of mass destruction.
This research will differ from previous research in the field by analyzing all the
mentioned factors in terms of how they inhibit Saudi Arabia and Iran from working
together and cooperating in the region as powerful players and peacemakers. The
rationale behind this research is to ease the process of peace in the Middle East, because
Saudi Arabia and Iran are powerful countries and can shift the roadmap for the region by
either working cooperatively or against each other.
The research study will use a content analysis qualitative methodology to gather
data and analyze the collected data. The purpose of this research is to explore and
understand the factors causing the conflict. For this study the qualitative methodology is
the best approach as this research will explore and identify relations while a quantitative
research would use numerical data to reach results and get information (Yin, 2009). This
research will not compare or measure data to come out with a generalized assumption;
the study will analyze a number of elements including religious background, mass
destruction weapons, economic history and current status, social life, and the political
system in order to grasp a clear picture of the future options for each country’s positive
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roles in the Middle East. The results of this research will serve as a guide for
policymakers and peace builders in order to better understand what these two countries
can accomplish based on their current capabilities and past governmental behavior.
Research Question
The primary research question is: Is the conflict of hegemony between Saudi
Arabia and Iran diminishing the role of the two nations as positive factors in the Middle
East?
Significance of the Topic
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran affects the entire region of the Middle
East; the effects of destabilization in the region are risky and should be considered. This
dissertation aims to cautiously detach facts concerning both Iran and Saudi Arabia from a
huge pool of information, as well as their political relations and actions toward other
Middle Eastern states. Through the analysis of this data, the research would provide
future peaceful political options and tighten their diplomatic relations.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Conflict in the Middle East is a repeated topic in the world of international
politics. The Palestinian Israeli conflict is the longest the region has witnessed and one of
the longest lasting conflicts globally. The Middle East also experienced two wars that had
a great number of international participants: the two wars in Iraq both in 1991 and 2003,
and the war between Iran and Iraq that lasted for eight years. Furthermore, there are other
conflict zones surrounding the area such as Afghanistan, the Caucasus, and the Horn of
Africa. Domestic and regional instabilities are caused by the connection between Middle
Eastern states and arms-producing governments in creating the Middle East as the most
militarized zone globally (Bureau of Verification and Compliance, 2000; Sköns et al.,
2002).
The average number of conflicts in the Middle East from 1960 to 2003 is higher
than the average in the Americas and Europe, yet lower than the average number of
conflicts in Africa and Asia. The frequency of conflict in Asia is the same as in the
Middle East; however, the duration of Middle Eastern conflict is longer. Between the
years 1960 and 2003 a diverse number of conflicts occurred; some of these conflicts
happened between the governments and Islamic militants such as the conflict in Algeria
from 1991 to2003, the Egyptian conflict from 1992 to 1998, and the Saudi Arabian
conflict in1979, while other countries struggled due to military factions such as the
conflicts in Iraq in the year 1963, the one in Morocco in 1971, and Syria in 1966. From
1975 to1989 Morocco fought the secessionists of the previous Spanish Sahara, and the
clashes that happened after the unifications of the two Yemens in 1962 to 1970, 1986,
and 1996 (Sørli, Gleditsch, & Strand, 2005).

10
The frequency of conflict in the Middle East has interested the U.S. military
presence in the region. It is considered a geostrategic concern for the American
government, as the high demand of American military is present. The region’s
development in the future will have effect on global prosperity and permanence. From
1979 the region of the Middle East witnessed a great number of conflicts, as these
conflicts have not been a threat the Middle East alone. The Islamic Revolution and the
new Iran faced the U.S with the American diplomats hostage issue, the Lebanese civil
war in 1982, the two Gulf wars in 1980 and 1990, the El Dorado Canyon air strikes
against Libya in 1986, and the U.S. intervention in Iraq. The interest of American
policymakers in the Middle East will continue to 2025 due to a number of factors. For
these policymakers the survival of the state of Israel and the peace process of the Middle
East is one of the central conflicts that impacts energy security, suppression of the
emergence of hegemons and proliferators, avoiding the production and spread of
weapons of mass destruction, endorsing regional stability through political and economic
reform, and the war against terrorism (Lesser, Nardulli, & Arghavan, 1998).
The key trends of conflict within the Middle East can be categorized by
demographic change, economic reform, state control, and Islam and nationalism. In
contrast with the world’s population growth, the Middle East’s population is anticipated
to double by the year 2025, while the world’s population growth witnessed a reduction in
its growth. The Middle East is recording an annual rate of 3% population growth and in
the 1990s the Gulf countries and the North Africa countries reported a 40% population
growth, whereas the per capita in the region faced a severe drop. By the year 2025 it is
anticipated that 30% of the people would be under the age of 15 in the areas with the
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highest growth rate. Such demographic change will have many significant destabilizing
effects; many will be moving from their local towns and villages to the bigger cities in
search of work, education, and health services. The enormous number of people seeking
urbanization in the region will overpopulate cities as is the situation in Cairo. Main cities
are the heart of economic and political development and will continue to attract the
people. The severity of impact in terms of providing social services, housing, public
transportation, and health care is much higher than in rural areas in the region. States that
are incompetent in meeting the high demands of urbanization create political conflict
around the Middle East (Lesser, Nardulli, & Arghavan, 1998).
The economic future of the region is facing instability in a great number of
Middle East states. This economic issue puts governments under the stress of high
demand on employment, inflation, and external dept. Unemployment rates in some Arab
countries, such as Algeria, Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen, are higher than the world’s
standards of 30%. The gross national product (GNP) during the 1990s has been flat in
general, while some countries such as Algeria had a decline in GNP as an effect of
political turmoil and a reduction in oil revenues. Oil revenues and oil production are the
vital economic keys to many Middle Eastern states as about 40% of oil revenues depend
on the exportation of a product, which leads to an economic situation that is vulnerable
and dependent as a single commodity (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1995). The
general insecurity of Middle Eastern countries has greatly raised the levels of security
expenses on institutions and military equipment. This tendency has damaging
consequences for the Middle East’s economic future as described due to its limit to oil
and energy investment (Richards & Waterbury, 2013).
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Scholars have noted that the measurement of success for a civil society is a
measure of political development in the region and vice versa (Norton, 1995). Developed
civil societies act as an indicator of democracy and political stability, while the demand
for more political transparency acted as a burden on governments across the Middle East
(Fuller & Lesser, 1995).
Nationalism and Islam are the two most important factors that will move the
political arena in the Middle East up until 2025. Since the Iranian Islamic Revolution,
political Islam has not been utilized heavily in the domestic politics in the Islamic world.
The progress of strategic countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Jordan, and
Iran is determined by Islamic politics whether from the government or its opposition. The
degree of success of governments in demolishing radical Islamic opposition is high in the
short term such as in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. These oppositions mirror
deep-rooted political, economic, and social complications. Suppressed Islamic
movements have a tendency to be regarded by the mass Muslim population as the single
genuine response to their civilizations’ predicaments and to extending an identity crisis
(Lesser et al., 1998). The progression of Islamist movements and the likelihood of the
establishment of Islamic governments will potentially have significant repercussions for
conflict within the social establishment of the Middle East, as this conflict might extend
to reach the Islamic world and the West (Huntington, 1993, 1996).
The geostrategic significance of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of
the Gulf and Iran is a major player in the world’s economic stability and security,
therefore, any conflict in this region can be global threat (Cordesman, 2003). The
continuous status of the cold war between the Arabian Gulf states and Iran will only
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make the situation worse, and peace an even harder task to be achieved. The location of
the Arabian Gulf, also known as the Persian Gulf, is a strategic economic and security
location. Yet, the past three decades of instability has affected the region by escalating
tension. The usage of the water passage in the region can be historically traced back to
the fifteenth century CE; it was used by many world power players. It also featured as the
third front during the Second World War (Naaz, 2001).
Regardless of the Saudi’s worry over Iranian strategies toward Iranian Shiite
interpretation of Islam, Saudi Arabia swings its foreign policy away from any form of
direct aggression towards Iran. Saudi Arabia’s policy is based on three key elements:
religion, oil, and the Arab world. Saudi Arabia views the country as the leading
government in all three elements, and Saudi is absolutely firm about maintaining this
status. With regard to religion, both countries respect the beliefs of the other regardless of
all the past hatred between the different religious sects both Shiites and Sunnis. Saudi
Wahhabi clerics view Shiites as inappropriate Muslims, while other Iranian Shiite clerics
believe that the Sunni Saudi Royal Family is not the legitimate custodian of the two holly
mosques, which represent the two most holy places for Muslims. Concerning the second
key factor, as the leading member of OPEC, Saudi would not involve its country in
conflict with Iran, as other members of the OPEC cartel have done even during the time
of Iranian/Iraqi war, although both oil ministers were obviously aiming at one another’s
oil policy and institution. The third factor concerns the Arab family’s view of Iran as
unworthy of trust after the Islamic revolution in 1979. During this time, Iran’s only ally
was Syria, and this diplomatic relation started in 1982. Iraq, after Saddam Hussain with
the majority of Shiites in the Iraqi government, became a new Iranian ally. However, this
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relationship only causes more tension and hostility from Arab countries towards Iran
(Henderson, 2009).
Iran has been in support of Shiite causes outside the Iran’s boarders; this support
reaches to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The Shiites in Saudi began to have a voice and to
demand political reform and direct participation. Shiite clergies motivated their followers
to stand against their governments, and even went further by requesting a split from
Saudi. It is not clear whether Iran is behind these calls; however it is obvious that the
Shiite radicals think highly of Iranian religious leaders’ guidance (Cordesman, 2009).
The Gulf States and Iran used to resolve their conflicts peacefully without the
help of other political powers, as they enjoyed a strong and trustworthy relationship.
However, after the Iranian revolution in 1979 the foreign policy of Iran changed
drastically. It adopted an anti-West policy, and focused its policy on Third World
problems and a populist anti-imperialist policy. Iran’s foreign policy after the year of
1979 concentrated on the exportation of the Islamic revolution, the reduction of satanic
power, and policy which was against monarchial and secular orientation. In this new
formation of its foreign policy Iran aimed towards changing the political map of the
region instead of coexisting and cooperating with neighboring countries (Alam, 2001).
This new anti-West stance under the guidance of Shi’ite religious figures precipitated a
tremendous change to Saudi-Iranian relations in the context of Saudi Arabia’s pro-West
Sunnite monarchy. This change in the relationship between these two countries created a
continuous rivalry (Sadeghi & Ahmadian, 2011).
Many have defined hegemony in the field of international relations. It has been
described as the power of one state over another; for example, Stiles (2009) defines it as
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“the predominance of one state over its peers” (pp. 2-3), while hegemony has also been
defined as a hierarchy system of power by Vitalis (2006) who describes it as “the
hierarchical order among rival great powers” (p. 26). Further, Keohane relates hegemony
to resources in his definition of hegemony as a “preponderance of material resources”
(Keohane, 1984, p. 32). The meaning of hegemony is not always connected to relations
of different players; the meaning can also relate to an order of a system. This means that
hegemony can be defined as the establishment of power in rules; the success of these
rules is based on the effectiveness of power adequacy and the readiness to apply it. The
power of hegemony can be a ‘powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing
interstate relations, and willing to do so’ (Keohane, 1989, p. 234; O’Brien, 2002, pp. 3-4).
Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, Saudi Arabia and Iran have strongly
acted as rivals to gain more impact in the Middle East and more importantly among the
among the Gulf States. Saudi Arabia and Iran describe their general policy guideline as
Islamic. Though the differences between both foreign policies are great, Saudi is a strong
ally with the West in contradiction to Iran’s foreign policy which views the West as the
greatest enemy. Saudi Arabia is a regional power, while Iran pursues revolutionary
change in the Gulf and the Middle East (Terrill, 2011).
Saudi Arabia gains its powerful status quo from its revenues from oil, stable
military alliance with the U.S., and their religious status as the custodians and protectors
of the two holy mosques in Makkah and Medina (Hammond, 2010). Saudi Arabia
follows a monarch system as their political system. According to fifth article of Saudi
Arabia’s Basic Law of Government dated in March 1992:
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1) Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2) Rulers of
the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants, 3) The most upright
among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His
Messenger's Sunna Traditions. 4) The Crown Prince shall devote himself
exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and shall perform any other duties
delegated to him by the King, 5) Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince
shall assume the Royal powers until a pledge of allegiance (bay’a) is given.
(Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2013, Article 5)
The Saudi Royal Family had always been in control and is hardly challenged; the Royal
Family is in control of state institutions. Al Saud princes and the Royal Family’s close
friends and allies are the ones running the executive office, the cabinet, the provincial
institutes, and the security positions such as the Ministry of Interior, the Intelligence
Agency, and the armed forces (Hamzawy, 2006). Many believe that the Saudi Royal
Family is ruling the country under the supervision of the religious authorities. This belief
comes from the strong relationship King Abdulaziz, the founder of the Kingdom, had
with senior religious figures. The pressure of religious clergies caused many conflicts
with the Saudi government in regards to their domestic and foreign policy (T. C. Jones,
2011). The relationship between political decisions and religious figures in Saudi can be
exaggerated; however, this exaggeration is backed up with historical facts that lead to this
created image. All Saudi kings respect, consider the religious involvement, and seek the
support of Ulema—a name that refers to the religious leaders who function as the
religious legitimizer for the Saudi political ruling family as the Ulema permit or legalize
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debatable decisions (Metz, 1992). The different conditions the rulers of the Kingdom
have went through allowed them to adjust their religious appearance and decision
depending on the case and conditions surrounding it (Bronson, 2005). In the early 1900s,
King Abdulaziz, the founder of the third Saudi state, established a religious army of
religious fighters; this army was called Ikhwan. The purpose of this establishment was to
calm down the population of the Kingdom and to have a soldier base against any regional
expansion. The Ikhwan were a useful tactic used by the founding king to join Makkah
and Medina, the two holy cities, to the founding of the country during its formation.
Subsequently, by year 1929 King Abdulaziz demolished this organization as it achieved
its goal and its existence was no longer a beneficial political tool (Bronson, 2005). King
Abdulaziz made this decision because the Ikhwan were causing problems for the
development of the country. They did not accept shifts in modern life in the 20th century;
they refused all sorts of machines especially those that were used for communication.
(Metz, 1992).
Abdulaziz was able to build his modern state and gain recognition from the
people by the late 1920s. The King was able to gain such a wide recognition by bearing
in mind the various interests of the people of the Kingdom. It was the policy of the
country to discuss political and social matters with the Ulema, a practice King Abdulaziz
followed (Metz, 1992). The Ulema council is the highest Saudi religious institution
directed by the grand mufti who is in charge of maintaining the Saudi system and society
in accordance with Islamic law. This position is recognized by the government as a senior
religious position (Bronson, 2005). Hence, when the King reaches a disagreement with
them, he works towards changing their minds. The Ulema are similar to the Ikhwan when
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dealing with new technology and ideas. For example, King Abdulaziz wanted to establish
a radio station; this new idea created a conflict between the Ulema and the ruler because
they refused the idea of a radio station. Their refusal was based on the fact that the new
invention was never used at the time of Prophet Mohammed, and it is a suspicious new
invention that does not have any Islamic roots. Abdulaziz was able to change their minds
and get their approval for the radio station by acknowledging the Ulema and assuring
them that through radio station the Quran will be broadcasted throughout the nation
(Metz, 1992).
Saudi Arabia’s political system is distinct and cannot be compared to other
neighboring countries for three reasons: 1) it is a relatively new state, as it was
established in the year 1932; 2) it controls the Wahhabi Islamic ideology as it has been
the ideological support for political and military decisions; and 3) its commitment to the
Islamic world. The shape of the legal and political systems in Saudi are based on sharia
law; this formation comes as a result of the religious and historical background of the
nation and its people. According to the Saudi government, sharia law governs the country
including the King himself (Dessouki, 1982). Since its establishment of the Kingdom, the
Royal Family has been associated by the Wahhabi doctrine. Both Sheikh Mohammed Ibn
Abdulwahhad and Mohammed Ibn Saud, the founder of the first Saudi state (historically
there has been three Saudi states), created a coalition in ruling the new theocratic state
(Dessouki, 1982). Abdulwahhab is an Islamic scholar; his ideas form the foundation the
Wahhabi ideology. He studied the Hanbali Islamic law at one of the rigorous Islamic
legal schools. His education was received in Medinah, Iraq, and Iran.
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The Saudi government refuses to tolerate the exposed practice of other religions
as the Saudi clergies and majority of the population do as well. The country is in
continuous support of Islamic charity organizations and groups across their borders; some
of these groups have been linked to terrorism actions and extremism. However, it is vital
to understand that senior Saudi clergies condemn and refuse terrorism and violence
(Cordesman, 2009). This appears very clearly after the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.; the
government showed its opinion as it was in favor of the war against terrorism in different
high profile events. On the Saudi Royal Embassy to the U.S. website, there are 55
statements by Saudi officials and seniors clergies emphasizing the position of the
Kingdom against terrorism as an ideology and action (“Public Statements,” 2007). The
Saudi government has control over the education system and clergy, because they receive
their payments from the government. Through this control, the government is able to
place limits on clergies who adopt extremism or make any extreme statement
(Cordesman, 2009).
Sheikh Saad bin Nasser Al Shathri is one of the latest examples of the effect of
such governmental control. He was fired from his position in the Council of Senior
Ulama after he criticized and judged King Abdullah on his decision to build the King
Abdullah University of Science and Technology, where both men and women researchers
and scholars work together. Ordinary Saudi universities are segregated educational
environments; the King had a vision of creating a new key element toward a modernized
economic Saudi Arabia with the creation of a co-educational university. However,
Shathri had a different vision of this new educational foundation; he responded to the
new Saudi desegregated community as a great sin from evil. His reason was that mixing
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men and women would result in emotional breakdowns and lust for the opposite sex, and
this will distract them from their goal of scientific research (Burke, 2011). The
membership of this council was always monitored; in the past King Faisal had put
tremendous efforts into banning religious figures from gaining recognition by joining
elite religious institutions (Bronson, 2005)
The president of Iran is elected for a four year term and given the chance to be reelected once. The Iranian constitution defines in theory the president as the second
official person in power in Iran; the president is in charge of the executive branch and
application of the constitution. In practice, the president’s power is limited to the power
of religion controlled by clerics and the Supreme leader. The Supreme leader is in charge
of armed forces, security, defense, and key foreign policy matters. After the president
comes to the cabinet, and their members are selected by the president. While the
parliament has a say on the selection, each selected member has to get the approval of the
parliament.
The Iranian president or the first vice president is in charge of the cabinet. The
parliament or the Iranian Majlis contains 290 elected members with four-year terms; the
authority of the Majlis includes introducing and passing laws, and indicting the president
or any of the Iranian ministers. Yet, laws cannot be passed by the Majlis without the
approval of the conservative Guardian Council. The role of the members of the Assembly
of Experts is to choose and appoint the Supreme Leader, observe his performance, and
eliminate him if the Supreme Leader is found to not meet the requirements of his
appointed position; the assembly holds two sessions per year. All members must be
clerics, each member is elected for eight years, and the Guardian Council checks and
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examines all candidates of the assembly. The Guardian Council is the most powerful
group in the Iranian government.
The six theologian members of the council are appointed by the Supreme Leader,
while the other six jurists are designated by the judiciary system and permitted by the
Majlis. Each member is given six years; however, the cycles are in phases to allow 50%
of changes every three years. The council is in charge of the approval of bills that are
delivered to the parliament as it has the power to ban any suggested bill if found
incompliant with Islamic law. The Guardian Council also has the authority of prohibiting
presidential, parliament, and assembly candidates from standing for elections. Iranian
reformers tried to control and lessen the authority given to the Guardian Council;
nonetheless, all the attempts were not successful. Ayatollah Khomeini philosophies are
the foundation of the Supreme Leader constitution; this constitution places the Supreme
Leader in the highest political rank with the most influential power in Iran. This position
authorizes the leader with the power of appointing the judiciary, six members of the
Guardian Council, commanders of affiliates of all military divisions, Friday prayers
sermoners, and the directors of radio and TV stations.
The presidential elections are not complete without the approval of the Supreme
Leader. The judiciary system in Iran has not once been liberated from political power; at
first it was under the control of the clerics, and then it was secularized. Later the Supreme
Court revolted and rejected all laws that do not reflect Islamic practices. This introduced
the delivery of laws formed from Sharia law and Islamic teachings. The judiciary not
only assures the application of Islamic-based law, it is also in charge of nominating six
members of the Guardian Council.
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The Iranian armed force includes the Revolutionary Guard and the Law
Enforcement Forces. All high ranked members of both bodies are appointed by the
Supreme Leader, are under his supervision, and only report to him. The Expediency
Council works as an advisory board for the Supreme Leader with authority to resolve
conflicts between the Majlis and Guardian Council. Members are appointed by the
Supreme Leader; all members are religious with a social and political background
(“Guide: How Iran is Ruled,” 2009).
The political revolutionary system that was established in Iran mirrors the
political characters that took place on taking over the Shah, although the Iranians were
motivated and inspired by the Western political system as it appears in their constitution,
instead of relying on Islamic Law. This resulted in a complicated political system and
positioned it between theocracy and democracy. On the top of this system is the Supreme
Leader with absolute and supreme authority, as well as responsibility for elected clerics
and non-elected councils in different offices in the system. With a long run of a number
of rights to veto one another, this political framework did not result in the successful
execution of any type of chief development within the political system.
Khamenei, the first Iranian president after the succession of the Shah, followed a
confrontational foreign policy that resulted in detaching Iran from the global community
and putting Iran in an eight year war with Iraq. The confrontational policy and war hurt
the Iranian economy progressively. This put president Rafsanjani in a position where
economic growth is essential, and he was able to advance the Iranian economy by
developing international relations. President Rafsanjani was elected twice, however, the
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high unemployment rate made Rafsanjani unpopular. There were a high number of young
graduates, and the high demands of employment on their side were not fully met.
President Khatami’s presidential era was full of contradictories. Khatami was a
reformist; however, as the Iranian political system is intertwined and complicated, he had
to face the common conservatives and their right to veto as members of the clerical
councils and the Supreme Leader Khamenei. More press freedom was approved by
reformists while the conservative authority would shut down newspapers and arrest
political critics. Khatami also started to build good relations with the West; however, the
events of 9/11 changed the scale in these new relationships.
In 2003 President Bush called Iran a part of the Axis of Evil. The American
presence in countries surrounding Iran escalated the insecurity in Iran. As a result, the
next presidential elections were controlled by the Iranian conservatives, and
Ahmadinejad was elected president, although these elections were alleged to be
fraudulent by many Iranians as a large number of reformer candidates were excluded
without providing any reasonable explanations. The Ahmadinejad administration was
conscious of the new power and freedom the young generation gained during Khatami’s
presidency and the need to strengthen its international relations with economically
powerful countries in order to support the Iranian economy.
The policy President Bush used against Iran only resulted in harming Iran’s
economy, causing it to be pushed away and isolated from the international community.
The U.S. played the role of the leader for the Western policy with Iran and threatened
more economic sanctions, as well as military presence and intervention. This policy
which was adopted and led by the U.S. did not help influence Iran towards peaceful talks

24
with the West in regards to its nuclear program, yet it caused the radicalization of the
neo-conservative authority of Iran. The foreign policy of Iran is not only influenced by
the Islamic Revolutionary ideology, their actions depend on their strategic interests. To
illustrate the statement, the position president Ahmadinejad undertook with Russia
contradicts its position with Israel and the United States. The Russian government’s
abuse against Muslims in Chechnya is not observed by the Iranians as the same as Israeli
abuse against Palestinians (Rasmussen, 2009). Iran’s urge to own its own nuclear
weapons and infrastructure to empower its position in the region as the Iranian authority
and elite proves that the country is facing security obstacles and seeks to be in a leading
position in the Middle East (Takeyh, 2007).
The position of Saudi Arabia from the time of the Iranian Revolution was based
on fear from the new Iran; the Saudi government announced its full support to the Shah
regime in a statement made by Crown Prince Fahd. The statement contained three main
points. The first point emphasized the Saudi support for the Shah regime as it is a
legitimate system as the Saudis described it. The second point accused that the bloodshed
in Iran would only cause losses for the Iranians and gains for the communist enemy. The
third point reflected the worries of the Saudi government of the future shift in the region
if the Shah is removed from power, as Crown Prince Fahd described it as a threat for
Middle East stability (Alkawaz, 2007).
The foreign policy of Iran changed drastically after the Iranian Revolution. This
change included its diplomatic relations with the GCC states. The cooperative SaudiIranian pre-revolution relations faced two key factors that put these two states in a
confrontational stage, namely ideology and regional rivals. The competition on regional
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power between Saudi Arabia and Iran after 1979 came from five factors: 1) sectarian
understanding of Isalm, 2) political affiliation with the U.S. and the West, 3) hegemony
over the Arabian Gulf, 4) influence growth over the Middle East, and 5) competition in
OPEC. Interpretation of Islam and relations with the West were the two most significant
factors that played a role in shaping and prioritizing both countries’ foreign policies. The
first factor was the background to the will of each country to hold the leadership position
among the Muslim world, while the second factor relied on the approach of Iran and
Saudi Arabia with regard to the West, especially the U.S. Since its formation in 1932
Saudi Arabia adopted a steady pro-West foreign policy; this policy included development
in politics, economics, and military dependency with the U.S. In contrast, after the 1979
revolution, Iran was looking for more independence, adherence to an anti-imperialist
ideology, and opportunities to create more stable political relations with the Third World.
Theoretical Framework
Neorealism. Neorealism was founded by Kenneth Waltz in 1979; his work was
directed to redevelop the theory of realism. Waltz believed that there were flaws in earlier
international relation theories such as classical realism. Kenneth was born in 1924 and
passed away in 2013; his goal was to explain understandings about international relations
by introducing neorealism. Waltz received his bachelor degree in economics after his
service in the Second World War. From the University of Columbia he earned his
graduate degree in political science; he was teaching at many U.S. universities including
Columbia and Berkeley. His career in universities started in 1957 at Columbia University
and ended at the same school. He was the president of the American Political Science
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Association twice, once in 1987 and again in 1988. Waltz was the recipient of the James
Madison Award in 1999 (Martin, 2013).
To understand how states behave, make decisions, and what encourages them to
remain in power it is necessary to recognize the role of international key players and
community and their effect on states. Neorealism is an international relation theory found
by Kenneth Waltz in the year 1997. Neorealism theory is also known as structural realism
as Kenneth reasons in his systemic approach (Sagan, 2004). This theory offers an
understanding of states’ behavior based on the effect of power, and it is the most used
approach in modern international relations (Powell, 1994). According to the theory of
Waltz, the international construction creates restrictions on how countries behave; this
means that states that act within the scope of the probable international array will stay in
power. Neorealism theory reintroduces the traditional realism theory, however, in an
accurate and intense positivistic social science (Waltz, 1979).
Structural realists believe that human nature has a slight effect on the position of a
state to seek power, in contrast to realists. Classical realists believe that human nature is
the main reason why states seek power. In neorealism or structural realism theory, the
structure of the international system is the motivator of states to seek power. The absence
of a higher authoritative power that rules all the other great powers, as well as the
absence of security assurance, will result in doubts about whether or not there will be an
attack from another state. These reasons are what motivate states to be adequately
powerful in order of self-readiness in the case of any future attack. This strive for power
among states, while fearing the unknown attack, traps them in a cycle of power
competition to guarantee their survival.
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Neorealists do not include the different types of regimes nor cultural differences
among the aspects of neorealism theory in a state wanting to gain power. This is due to
the equal basic incentives the international architectures make for powerful states. The
government type of all states does not have an enormous effect on the way it acts toward
other states. According to neorealism, all states are equal as they are anticipated to be
similar, yet power differentiates between states, since it considers power as the definitive
survival. A state’s power is measured by its material capabilities and its latent power; the
first is considered to military resources while the second power is the wealth of a country
and its population. These two types of power a state may possess explains that war is not
the only method for a country to gain power; a state’s increasing population and share of
the world’s wealth is a type of power that a country may have (Mearsheimer, 2006). In
the case of Saudi Arabia and Iran, both countries are aiming to gain more power in order
to protect their states from each other. Iran’s possibility of nuclear acquisition puts the
state in a more powerful position which worries Saudi Arabia. However, according to
neorealism, a state’s power is not only measured by its military assets; other factors add
to it such as population size and economy.
States compete for power based on five assumptions; none of the following
assumptions work alone as a power-seeking motivator for a state. However, all five
together are what encourage states in the international structure to want power. The five
assumptions are: anarchy, offensive military capabilities, uncertainty of other states
intentions, state’s survival, and rationality. Anarchy does not mean chaos; it is the reverse
meaning of hierarchy. In other words, it is an ordering system that means that power is
decentralized as there is not power above states. Offensive military capabilities mean that
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all states acquire some sort of power that enables the state to pose as a threat to any of its
neighboring states. The power each state has differs from state to state as it also might
change from time to time. States will never be sure about the other states’ intentions; it
might be understood to some degree from the actions of authoritative figures and decision
makers; however, it is difficult to be certain whether a state would take an action to
change its power balance or if the state is pleased with its status quo. Survival is the
foremost objective of all states, as they do seek to obtain other goals such as wealth.
However, protecting a state’s local political order is a priority to other goals because they
rely on the survival of the state first and foremost. Further, rational states are able to
manage and create strategies to maintain its survival. Yet, states might mislead
themselves from wrongful strategies depending on inaccurate information (Mearsheimer,
2006).
Idealism in international relations. Idealism is the idea of progressing
international relations ethically. “An idealist in this sense is one who places before
himself in private or public affairs as attainable a goal which other citizens, perhaps equal
moral, do not believe to be so attainable” (Smith, 1923, p.2). Idealism is based on the
possibility of building a political system on morality. Negative instincts of humans can be
ignored and silenced to enable the idea of establishing national and international
standards of conduct to reach peace, wealth, collaboration, and justice in the world.
According to idealists, war is not considered in the modern world, as humans have
evolved from the idea of destructive institution. The cost of having a war is beyond the
benefits and gains of it (Brown, 1992).
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Wilsonianism or idealism arose as different political policy philosophy by the end
of the First World War. The globe was directed to the idea of how to protect states from
war and avoid conflict in the international community. Wilson was aimed towards
finding local and international democratic institutions that are able to protect democracy
and human rights (Russett, 1993). Idealists claimed that reaching world peace can be
achieved by having foreign policy makers rely on the nation’s opinion for their decision;
in other words, having a foreign policy that reflects the democratized public opinion
(Long & Wilson, 1995). The optimistic policy of idealism is to override the international
anarchy in order to accomplish a more multicultural international structure. Idealists
highlight the strength of reasoning to beat prejudice and abolish threatening forces.
Through education and democracy and engaging public opinion in foreign policy, the
world’s public will be empowered. According to idealism, the UN has a vital position in
forming the world public opinion. Idealism also recognizes the existence of a shared
agreement of interest among people worldwide, regardless of the incompatible interests
among their states. Humans do not share the same values and culture; however, they all
tend to share the same need of security, prosperity, acknowledgment, and respect
(Wilson, 2011). In both Iran and Saudi Arabia, it seems that both counties are somewhat
following this theory. As for the Palestinian conflict, the public opinion is recognized and
adopted in their foreign policies. Both states foreign policy is influenced by the ethical
values of their religious background.
Soft Power. This theory recognizes the power of making others desire to reach
the goals that another wants, in other words, getting “others to want the outcomes that
you want” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). This achievement can be reached by attracting others to a
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goal instead of using coercion. Soft power eliminates conflict during the process of
behavioral change, since it does not use force to change but utilizes persuasion and
attraction to get the wanted change. Nye also recognizes that soft power does not always
have to be the case of positive influence; it can lead to bad changes such as using
propaganda as a format of soft power (Nye, 2011). Soft power is the second type of
power as it is the opposite of hard power, such as the use of military force. Nye sums up a
state’s soft power in three elements: 1) the culture of the state such as the place that
others value and consider attractive, 2) the state’s political standards when practiced both
locally and internationally, and 3) the legitimacy and morality of a state’s foreign policy
(Nye, 2011). The holy places in both Saudi Arabia and Iran are appealing to people on
both sides, as well as the foreign policy of each country. The Minority Saudi Shiites
admire Iran and its policy as it is a reflection of their religious beliefs.
According to Nye (2004), soft power is considered to be a more challenging tool
for states to exercise, because state’s resources are not on the scope of state control and
soft power does not work directly to create the format of a state’s policy. These two
reasons would lengthen the process of effective soft power influence that might take
several years to achieve. The notion of soft power is descriptive not normative; this leads
to the understanding that soft power may be used to conduct evil. For instance, Hitler and
Stalin utilized soft power to receive what they wanted from their people, and this does not
make the usage of soft power in these cases good even though they were able to reach
their intended goals. Nye also believes that soft power is not a type of idealism or
liberalism, but it challenges the meaning of realism in international relations. It is only a
power method to achieve goals (Nye, 2011).
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Research Gap
Throughout the reading of the literature review, the researcher was able to
discover the limits of the current studies available on the Iranian-Saudi conflict of
hegemony. The previous research focused on the spread of power each country seeks,
and the tools used to exercise this need. The researcher was not able to find enough
literature that supports the idea of conflict resolution in this case. It is also notable that
this is a continuous conflict, and updates will need to be researched. The recent update
about the Geneva resolution of the G5+1 agreement with Iran in regards to the nuclear
program adds a new layer to the conflict with Saudi Arabia. President Hassan Rouhani,
the new president of Iran, is taking a different and unexpected approach within the
Iranian foreign policy by accepting to negotiate with the West.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been addressed from several
angles by researchers from the foreign policy and international relations field. Yet, the
topic needs to be analyzed using the skills of conflict analysis and resolution to better
understand the continuous situation between both countries. New developments are
happening within the region and more dramatic positive changes continue to unfold
within the Iranian foreign policy in regards to its relations to the West and in accordance
to its nuclear policy.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
The goal of this dissertation is to explore the future options of the Iranian-Saudi
relations in terms of understanding past patterns of exchange between both countries. The
researcher intends to develop timeframes depending on the nature of the political relation
in order to determine possible future options to strengthen this tense relation.
“A research design is a plan for collecting and analyzing data in order to answer
the investigator’s question” (Holsti, 1996, p. 24). Content analysis can be defined as “any
qualitative data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative
material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002, p. 453).
Qualitative content analysis methodology is an appropriate method for this dissertation,
as it is intended to provide a proper explanation of the Iranian-Saudi relation since the
Iranian revolution. Through the analysis the researcher will identify a possible future for
this diplomatic relationship.
Qualitative content analysis provides researchers with a better understanding of
social reality using a scientific method (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009). Qualitative content
analysis was first used to meet the research needs in the fields of anthropology,
qualitative sociology, and psychology to find the meanings of physical communication. It
is a deductive tool that helps the testing phase of hypotheses or research questions
developed from theories or previous research. The purpose of this type of qualitative
research is to ground the investigation of themes and the implications resulted from these
themes. Qualitative content analysis offers researchers a tool to develop theory. Sampling
requires the search of existing texts selected in a manner that will guide the researcher to
find the answers for the research questions. This qualitative approach enables researchers
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to reach an explanation for typologies, which results in a clear and cohesive
understanding of the research results (Berg, 2001). Qualitative content analysis will
provide the researcher with a framework to organize data into categories based on the
researcher’s interpretation of the data. This step uses the process of inductive reasoning
depending on the generated themes from the data (Patton, 2002). The process of content
qualitative research of inductive reasoning starts from the bottom building its way to the
results through themes (Marshall & Rossman, 2006).
Rational for Content Analysis
In order to know if content analysis is the best tool to use in investigating the
topic of this research, the features of content analysis were studied. Sarantakos (2005)
described the features of content analysis as:
1) Is a documentary method that includes written material, official documents,
speeches, photographs, and so on, 2) Is the study of the content of texts, such as
words, meanings and pictures, 3) Is quantitative, in that it measures objectively
specific attributes of text contents, 4) Is qualitative, in that it focuses on meanings
and interpretations in text, 5) Is non-reactive, in that the document was not
produced with the knowledge that it would be subjected to this analysis, 6) Is
transparent, in that its procedure is clear and open and that it can be replicated, 7)
Is unobtrusive, in that it studies the document without the knowledge of the
author, 8) Is a diverse and flexible method that can be applied in a variety of
contexts and Materials, 9) Is longitudinal, in that it can address the same issue
over a period of time, 10) Is comparative, in that it can produce cross-sectional
and cross-cultural data. (p. 299)
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Qualitative content analysis is the best tool to use in investigating this topic, as the
researcher will be using historical and current data on both Saudi Arabia and Iran. The
data the researcher used in the literature review covers the political system, economic
background, religious background, and historical exchange between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Through this data, the researcher will be able to grasp the meaning of the text,
documents, and speeches that are included in the literature. It will also provide a meaning
of the relationship between both countries in different Iranian presidential eras, in order
to find the best period these two countries enjoyed in accordance to their diplomatic
relation. This understanding will enable the researcher to predict the best practice Saudi
Arabia and Iran should use to strengthen their diplomatic relation that has an effect on the
Middle East. Krippendorff (1980) describes content analysis as “Potentially,… one of the
most important research techniques in the social sciences, it seeks to understand data not
as a collection of physical events, but as symbolic phenomena and to approach their
analysis unobtrusively” (p. 7). The particular content analysis utilized in this dissertation
considers how different periods of the diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi
Arabia after the Iranian revolution can contribute to predictions and assumptions for a
more productive and engaging relation in the future.
Formulating the Research Questions to be Answered
The formulated research question for this dissertation is: Is the conflict between
Saudi Arabia and Iran diminishing the role of the two nations as positive factors in the
Middle East?
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Selecting the Sample to be Analyzed
The researcher will use the CIAO database in order to find brief policies and
papers related to the topic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Praeger Security International
database will also be used as it has a great number of books that cover the historical facts
of these two countries and their diplomatic relations. Online news websites will also be
used to cover events and current developments on the topic.
Applying the Criteria
Saudi Arabia and Iran were typed in the mentioned databases and the research
was specified by using terms such as diplomatic relations, Islamic revolution, Arab
Spring, oil, sanctions, reform, economic, and political system. The researcher will use
content analysis to recognize and illustrate patterns of the different periods of the IranianSaudi relations. Data will be categorized chronologically in order to address themes and
patterns.
Establish Data Collection Unit and Unit of Analysis
The analysis of this dissertation will focus on political exchange between Iran and
Saudi Arabia and frame it into periods; the study will examine texts and actions taken by
both political systems since the rise of the Islamic republic of Iran. The unit of analysis
will be the systems that Iran and Saudi Arabia have used since 1979 to the date this
research is conducted. The system will allow the researcher to understand and define the
previous patterns of behavior between both states.
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Chapter 4: Case Study and Findings
Saudi Arabia
The economic development Saudi enjoyed in the 1970s from oil revenues
prompted the government to release itself from the general dependency on religious
scholars. However, this shift in the government’s direction away from religious support
fired back harshly. In 1979 the danger of religious scholars posed to the stability of the
Royal Family appeared clearly as religious rioters gathered in the Holy Mosque in
Makkah in a plan to confiscate it (T. C. Jones, 2011).
The Saudi government does not have a formal constitution or political parties
since they do not have any elections. Critics outside of Saudi Arabia do not have the full
and accurate understanding of the status of the government’s popularity within the
country. To clarify, the power of the King is restricted and consensual; the limitation on
King’s power is due to other source of powers inside the Royal Family, such as religious
practices, Saudi traditions, key tribes’ leaders, business leaders, and the Ulema.
Westerners do not recognize the legitimacy of this system as power is not elected, though
the Royal Family has always wanted to attain a wide social and political acceptance
(Cordesman, 2003).
Sharia serves as the core authoritative political tool in Saudi Arabia. The law of
sharia provides the parameters of all political aspects and processes; it also provides
flexibility to members of the Royal Family and elites in policies that are not precisely
against the law. Previously, Saudi Arabia never had a written constitution or a
constitutionally based institution. Saudi Kings believe that the Saudi citizens are
protected and receive social justice by sharia law that is rooted in the Quran and Islamic
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practices. By the year 1979, after the attacks on the Holy Mosque in Makkah, King Fahad
who was Crown prince then declared the basic system of Saudi rule. A committee of
eight men was created and led by Prince Naif, the minister of interior. The committee
was required to write a constitution consisting of 200 articles, but by year 1981 the
system was not yet written (Dessouki, 1982).
Saudi Arabia has a number of factors that allow it to maintain and preserve
power. All the country’s resources are in the hands of the Royal Family; this is possible
due to the absence of a system for accountability. All these resources including the oil are
used to develop the Kingdom and to maintain tribal structure and alliance in order to
sustain the legitimacy of the Royal Family amid the people of the Kingdom (Hamzawy,
2006).
By the first of March 1992, King Fahad issued a royal decree embodying the
Basic Law of Governance. The document contained 82 articles in nine chapters. The
chapters include the following: 1) general principles, 2) the law of governance, 3) the
values of the Saudi society, 4) economic principles, 5) rights and duties, 6) the authorities
of the state , 7) financial affairs, 8) institutions od audits, and 9) general principles. It was
applied from the date it was issued. According to the introduction of the royal decree, it
was a result of considering the interests of the public, a reflection of the Kingdom’s wide
development, and the need and aspiration for the country’s objectives (Royal Embassy of
Saudi Arabia, 2013).
During the past decade, the government of Saudi Arabia has shown some
exceptional political development. Since 2002 the government has accomplished steady
yet gradual political reform in several policies. Some of these developments include
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establishment of Majlis Alshura or the Shura Council, municipal elections, the
legalization of civil society actors, educational reform, and the establishment of the
institution of national dialogue conferences (Hamzawy, 2006).
The national dialogue center was established by King Abdullah when he was the
Crown Prince in the year 2003. This forum offered Saudi citizens an environment to
expose their thoughts about topics which historically have been politically sensitive.
These topics varied such as the role and rights of Saudi women (for example, there was a
session on the right for women to drive in Saudi). The openness of the dialogue forum
was even reflected in the Saudi media, since opinion writers were able to criticize
religious thoughts. There are many examples of drastic changes in journalistic freedom of
speech to some extent; for example, the work of Ibn Taymiyya, the root of Saudi
religious ideology, was questioned several times. Even though this freedom is not
explicitly granted, the decision for an article to be published depends on the exact article.
One journalist stated of his articles examining Ibn Taymiyya was rejected three times.
The growing openness can be characterized by discussions about social grievances and
critique and examination of extremist and/or wrongful interpretations of Islam (Bronson,
2005).
Critics must understand that Saudi Arabia cannot simply mimic the Western
policy to achieve development; policy development must be reached on Saudi terms.
Nonetheless, such allegations neglect the characteristics of the Saudi society, which is
basically a combination of religion, culture, tribal practice, and the variety of national
character. Imitating a Western political policy of democracy would cause political
disruptiveness, factionalism, and the politicization of Islam instead of reaching advanced
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social development. The many layers of issues that must be considered in the Saudi
context in order to make political and social reform include the country’s diversity of
Wahhabi Islam, population and economic issues, province divisions, and the
centralization the government’s mechanism (Cordesman, 2003).
Political reform is not a step taken that has been taken by King Abdullah alone.
For instance, King Faisal executed his plan for political reform by using maximized
flexibility an Islamic law. His first royal verdict, which included a ten point reform
program, was issued after he was announced as King. The following points illustrate the
program.
1. While reconfirming the state’s adherence to Islamic law, it promised to issue a
basic law (a constitution) and set up a consultative council.
2. It pledged enactment of provincial regulations that would establish local
governments.
3. It proclaimed independence of the judiciary and promised to establish a
supreme judicial council and a ministry of justice.
4. The judicial council was to consist of 20 members chosen from both the lay
jurists and the Ulema.
5. It promised to strengthen Islamic propaganda.
6. It proclaimed the reform of the committees of public morality.
7. It proclaimed the government’s solicitude for social matters and education and
pledged control of retail prices, establishment of scholarships for students,
social security regulations, a law protecting laborers from unemployment, and
provision of innocent means of recreation for all citizens.
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8. It announced the intention to regulate economic and commercial activities
through appropriate legislation, which would ensure progress, economic
expansion, and encouragement of capital investment.
9. It pledged a sustained endeavor to develop the country’s resources and
economy, in particular, roads, water resources, heavy and light industry, and
self-sufficient agriculture.
10. It abolished slavery in the kingdom” (Dessouki, 1982a, para. 27-26)
The ten-point program relied on Islamic practices and principles, yet it represented a new
chapter in the Saudi judicial system. It presented the establishment of the Saudi Ministry
of Justice and announced its independency from political power, judges and courts freed
from any authority, and rule using Islamic sharia law. King Faisal continued his reform
plan to cover financial and economic growth; he constructed many regulations such as
the regulations for investing foreign capital, companies, labor law, and civil service
(Dessouki, 1982).
In general, King Faisal was able to create a mediocre standing point between
conservatism and modernism. He chose to preserve the Kingdom’s religious image and
gradually push the country to a more modern stage while still protecting it as much as
possible from the negativity of imposing a modern change in the country. King Faisal
recognized the unwanted elements of Western modernization; however, he also
recognized the need for the Saudi economy and society for modernization so he sought a
middle way. His economy, education, social welfare, and Western technology
development all benefitted from Saudi oil revenues (Cordesman, 2003). Faisal was also
behind the establishment of the Islamic conference; this aided and strengthened the Saudi
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influence on the Islamic world. The government also has been known for its financial
support to numerous Islamic causes and political needs (Ahrari & Noyes, 1993).
King Khalid followed his brother Faisal in his focus on reform, ruling the country
from 1975-1982. The same policy shaped the ultimate and unlimited rule of the King;
they also supported the King’s role by the bureaucratic style of government. Oil revenues
maintained economic, business, health sector, and education progress. Free healthcare
and education was provided to all citizens; this was to empower and support the people
who were not into business and did not gain any social and economic growth with the
change. Although there was a clear introduction to Western influence, the balance was
kept. Through the unlimited rule of the King, economic and social development was
maintained (accepted by the Wahhabi ethical code) as were strong relations with tribe
leaders; this allowed the king to maintain an accepted traditional and cultural life style
(Kostiner, 1997).
The rise in oil price in the early 1960s and 1970s reached $40 per barrel; the
vision of King Khalid was to benefit from Saudi oil revenues to fill the state treasury and
development initiatives were quickly executed. This economic shift had in impact on
social life in Saudi Arabia; the hope was to quickly achieve this plan and take the country
to the next level in a short time. The government began to activate the public and private
sectors, took steps to reform governmental agencies, and established chamber of
commerce branches around the Kingdom (Almuhanna, 1995). King Khalid’s era was
known as the Saudi golden era and the era of goodness. He pushed the country into the
development race along with his brother, Crown Prince Fahd. The execution of the
second Saudi five-year development plan was during Khalid’s time, and it cost the
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country 500 billion Saudi Riyals, a 9% increase in comparison to the cost of the previous
plan. The third plan was also during his time and cost 783 billion Saudi Riyals.
Development plans included housing by launching the real estate development fund;
education that included public and higher education by establishing hundreds of schools
for both boys and girls and new universities around the country and sending over 100,000
young Saudis to top universities around the world to get proper education; a healthcare
system by establishing 29 new hospitals and 681 clinics furnished with modern
equipment and professional staff; transportation; the establishment of the institution of
technical training and education; and the Council of Civil Service to take over the
planning and organization of Civil Service Affairs in ministries and governmental
departments that issued and developed existing labor laws (Alkhareif, 2010).
King Khalid’s reign was known to be effective; he completed his brother King
Faisal’s policy to represent Saudi Arabia in the United Nations. While the U.S.-Saudi
relations continued to be pleasant, the Israeli conflict with Palestine was a frustration
factor in this relationship. King Khalid expressed to Jimmy Carter during his visit to
Riyadh in 1978 that the only resolution for the conflict would be full withdrawal from
Israel. However, his leadership skills were unlike Faisal’s. He enjoyed openness with the
press about the rationale and justification of Saudi foreign policy; he used the same
policymaker figures upon whom King Faisal relied, yet he provided them with more
authoritative and independent roles. In 1976 Khalid took the step in making visits to Gulf
States; these visits strengthened the Saudi-Gulf relations and probably led to the
establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). After the visits, Iran sent a
proposal for a collective security arrangement; the proposal was not immediately rejected
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but was taken into consideration due to the suspiciousness of an Iranian hegemony. In
1979 after Egypt and Israel signed the peace treaty, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy with
neighboring countries who sought stability changed. King Khalid ended all relations with
Egypt and asked Arab countries to adopt economic sanction policies towards Egypt.
Although King Khalid made his position clear about Israel, this did not protect him from
opposition; he faced two incidents that the Saudi history will always remember.
The first was a strike against the government which took place in the Grand Holy
Mosque in Makkah, where Juhaiman and about 500 other men and women seized the
mosque. According to the Juhaiman the leader of the strike, the Royal Family lost their
validity to rule the country as a result of corruption and close relations with the West. For
the government to take military action against Juhaiman and the group, they had to
receive a religious opinion from the Ulema, as blood should not be shed at the Grand
Mosque. After the government received the approval, it took them two weeks to end the
seizure and all men were publicly executed (Metz, 1992).
The Grand Mosque seizure projected a new opposition model into the Saudi
government. This group was not only sought a ban on women’s social involvement, they
also sought bans on television broadcasting and movies, as well as strict obedience to
Sharia law. They forced religion into politics by accusing the Royal Family of not being
religiously fit to rule the Kingdom. The attackers were member of large tribal groups (the
Utayba and Qahtan), workers, members of the Saudi army and National Guard, and
students. When King Khalid first heard the news about the seizure, he accused the Shiites
supported by outsiders (Dessouki, 1982).
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The second incident was in the Eastern Province, Alqatif, two weeks after the
attacks in Makkah. Alqatif is the home of the Saudi Shiites, and this was not the first riot
for Shiites in the region as it also happened in 1970 and 1978. However, these rioters
carried pictures and posters of Khomenini; more than 20,000 National Guard troops were
sent to stop the riots. After these two events, the Saudi government decided it was time to
form a consultative assembly—Majlis Alshoura or Shoura Council. The Saudi
government and Aramco, the Saudi oil company that resides in the Eastern province,
have not discriminated against Shiite employment, a sign of improvement for this
minority group. However, living conditions and local services were still the same and
lacked proper advancement, which led to a second demonstration in 1980. A plan to
develop living conditions was immediately adopted and executed; the plan incorporated
home loans, schools, hospitals, street construction and lighting, sewer projects, and an
electricity power plant development (Metz, 1992).
The rebellious Saudi Shiites who live in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia
where the oil exists account for 10% of the entire Saudi population and 50% of the
eastern province population. As this group has rebelled against the government since the
era of King Khalid violently demanding equal rights, they continued to do so with their
headquarters in the UK and the U.S., communicating via fax. They worked their way
through the Western media spreading their anti-Saudi Royal Family publicity.
By the end of 1993, they reached a settlement with King Fahd. As a result of this,
arrangement, all anti-regime activity was discontinued by the Saudi Shiites in Saudi
Arabia and overseas. From the King’s side the government promised and started to
ameliorate Shiite treatment, provides funding for development plans and projects to
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improve their living conditions, and stopped Wahhabi leaders from agitation against the
Shiites. Fahd also went a step further and promised all Shiite political exiles that they
would be respected and never harassed upon return to Saudi Arabia (Abir, 1997).
King Fahd rose to throne after the death of his brother Khalid in 1982. His era
witnessed two wars: first the Iranian/ Iraqi war, and then the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait.
Fahd had to make a critical decision to allow U.S. troops to enter Saudi Arabia; however,
the decision did not take time (Yetiv, 1997). The decision was made in a meeting
between King Fahd, Prince Abdulla Crown Prince, Prince Sultan Minister of Defense,
and Prince Bander (Saudi ambassador to the U.S.) from the Saudi side, and on the
American side, Secretary Cheney and General Norman Schwarzkopf. The Americans
flew to Saudi Arabia in order to gain Fahd’s permission by showing him the danger his
country was facing. After a presentation from the American deputation, King Fahd
discussed the matter with Prince Abdullah and Prince Sultan and made the decision to
grant the U.S. troops permission to enter Saudi Arabia (Yetiv, 1997).
During the 1980s opposition against the Saudi Royal Family recurred. The goals
for these groups were due to the government’s corruption, its partnership with the West,
and calls for modernization. After the Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait in the year 1990 and
with King’s Fahd request for U.S. military support, the voice of extremism was at its
peak. Many clerics, Islamic preachers, and some members of the Ulema criticized and
attacked the presence of the infidel on the holy land; they made sure that their speeches
were widely spread by recoding them on tapes and spreading them throughout the
country. Despite the fact that the King had the support of the Ulema for his decision to
allow U.S. military presence in the country with the issuance of a fatwa—a religious
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announcement justifying and legalizing the King’s choice, extremists did not stop
attacking and fueling the people against the Royal Family. The opposition not only
emanated from the religious groups in the Kingdom, liberal educated intellectuals also
began to call for limits on the control of Ulema on the Saudi’s daily life. Once these calls
were ignored by the government, they and the Saudi middle class population condemned
the support of the U.S. to the Saudi government (Abir, 1997).
The intervention of the U.S. government triggered political and social disruption
within the Kingdom. Right after the Second Gulf War, Saudi Arabia was threatened and
attacked by terror attacks; as an outcome of one these attacks nineteen U.S. soldiers were
killed in year 1996. At that time King Fahd was ill and made the decision of turning the
power over to the Crown Prince Abdullah (Yetiv, 1997). The existence of American,
French, and British forces on Saudi soil after the Gulf War called the legitimacy of the
Royal Family into question by both Sunni oppositionists and Iranian Shiite extremists.
This rejection of the Western troop’s presence resulted in a number of low level violent
incidents, as well as two major bombings. The first bombing was in the Saudi National
Guard Training Center in Riyadh in 1995, while the second one took place at the U.S. Air
Barracks at Al-Khobar in 1996. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida also organized attacks
against the U.S. government outside Saudi Arabia, such as the bombing of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 (Cordesman, 2003).
After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, during the period of Fahd’s rule,
the relations with Iran started to take a different direction. As mentioned previously,
Saudi Arabia never disconnected its diplomatic relations with Iran even under the worst
conditions. These Saudi efforts started to pay off, and President Rafsanjani made the first
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Iranian attempt to strengthen the relations. The Iranians stopped the support of Saudi
Shiite uprisings, as well as the Iranian attacks against the Royal Family, as the Iranian’s
also stopped supporting rioters during the season of Hajj. Saudi Arabia and Iran
collaborated to convince the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to
reduce oil production in June 1997. The Iranian airlines started to fly to Saudi Arabia in
September 1997. Fahd sent the Saudi Minister of State to Tehran to deliver a message
from the King and Prince Abdullah Crown Prince as a positive response to the Iranian
invitation to Saudi to attend the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Tehran
in December 1997 (Cordesman, 2003), as well as to establish a high joint annual
committee between the two countries to activate trade and economic cooperation. The
first meeting was held in December 1998, reaching a volume of trade exchange between
Saudi and Iran of more than $500 million by the year 2000 (Kamil, 2001).
King Fahd’s era was known for its regional effect in the Middle East. King Fahd
acted as the mediator in Arab conflicts; a great example of his role occurred during the
Lebanese conflict in the year 1989. King Fahd made a tremendous step to stop the
bloodshed in Lebanon by inviting the entire Lebanese National Assembly—both
Christians and Muslim—to resolve their political crisis. The Lebanese were not able to
meet at home due to the violence. At the end of the panel the Lebanese were able to vote
on a reform plan and elect a new president for their country. This exemplifies the huge
influence Saudi Arabia had during Fahd’s ruling. He was also able to restore the SaudiEgyptian relations, and paid a visit to Cairo in 1987. The visit not only affected the
relations of both countries, it represented the substantial end to the Egyptian remoteness
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from Arab countries. It also emphasized the essential role of Saudi leadership by
positioning the Kingdom amongst Arabs (Metz, 1992).
King Fahd emphasized the establishment of two key points that positively
affected the stability of the Kingdom. The first key point was the establishment of the
industrial sector, as he planned to create a strong base for the Saudi industrial field by
offering the engagement of private investors, and doubled the fund provided to the
industrial development fund to allow more factories to be established. The government
also was engaged in industry by adopting huge petrochemical projects in Jubail and
Yanbu. He also focused on agriculture, which transformed the country from being an oil
importer to an exporter. The second key point was strengthening Gulf relations in order
to face any threat to the region after the Iraq-Iran war. One of the most distinctive
features of the reign of King Fahd was the development of the shareholding companies
and the emergence of the Saudi stock market, which included nearly a million percent
share in more than seventy shareholding companies, and banks were among those
companies that have transformed into shareholding companies trading shares in the Saudi
market (Almuhanna, 1995). Unemployment rates among Saudi nationals has reached
12% (Hoetjes, 2013), while government programs that have been designed to provide
generous support and social services in Fahd’s plan had to be reduced in lieu of the global
oil price drop crisis )“Nubtha an hayat almalik,” 2005).
When referring to reform in Saudi Arabia, it must be clarified that the Saudi
Royal Family had been grouped into two groups. King Abdullah, the current king, leads
the moderate group as he appeared to encourage steady and gradual openness and more
involvement of citizens in politics limited to the fact that this involvement and freedom
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does not interfere with the supremacy and stability of the Royal Family. The moderate
group has fervently tried to explain their moderate concept of political reform to Wahhabi
religious leaders, and reduce the discrimination among minorities and groups who were
in agony on account of Wahhabi practices such as their stance towards women and Saudi
Shiites. King Abdullah was in charge of the Kingdom since almost all of the executive
authority was conferred on to him after his brother King Fahd became seriously ill.
Before his ascendency to power in 2005, King Abdullah acted positively by promoting
the concept of reform that the government commenced in 2002. Prince Saud Alfaisal, the
Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia for thirty years, is another strong member of the
moderate group. Alfaiasal publically confronted and challenged the Wahhabi leaders
about their position with regard to women’s civil rights and political participation. Prince
Talal, the half-brother of King Abdullah and characterized for his honesty and being
opinionated, urged for the reform of the religious institution, empowering the consultant
parliament, the Shoura Council, by enabling them to make decisions instead of the
executives and turning it into an elected institution monitored with budgetary supervision
(Hamzawy, 2006).
To understand the steps King Abdullah has made to the religious establishment,
the relationship between the government and religious leaders according to Saudi Basic
law must be clarified. Article 23 states “The State shall protect the Islamic Creed, apply
the Sharia, encourage good and discourage evil, and undertake its duty regarding the
Propagation of Islam” (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2013).
The agreement between the Royal Family and Alsheikh (the founder of the
Wahhabi ideology) and his family was described as a bond based on politics and religion.
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This relation helped King Abdulaziz, the founder of the Saudi third state, to endorse his
position by the use of Islam to influence the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. Adbulaziz’s
technique was successful; tribal groups and families yielded to the Wahhabi version of
Islam and guaranteed Abdulaziz political loyalty. Both parties supported each other;
nevertheless, there is a balance to this relationship. From the very beginning of the third
Saudi state after the oil discovery, the Royal Family formed more powerful ties with the
community and lessened its reliance on the Ulema. The government’s dependence on
elements other than the Ulema assisted the country when modern production was
proposed. The balance of power is useful as well especially in cases when, for example,
uncertain opinions about a topic arise from the society, the government can use the
assistance of the Ulema to issue a fatwa—a religious judgment to legitimize the
resolution (Quilliam & Kamel, 2003).
The year 2002 shows a change in the Saudi religious establishment. The actions
of the moderate group of the Royal Family created dissatisfaction within the
establishment. Clerics have always voiced their opinion of the risk of political openness.
The Ulema enjoyed an escalation in their own power right after the golden liberal Saudi
years ended in 1960. After King Abdullah started to gain executive authority in 2002,
clerics started to lobby with the conservative group of the Royal Family against religious
reform. Many announcements and reports were published by the religious demonizing
educational development and advancement in women’s civil rights grounded in
governmental decisions, as they tried to hinder social and civil reform. Religious reform
was not the only change since 2002; the Saudi government does not support the idea of
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political parties and monitors all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), facts which
limited the activity of peaceful dissenting groups (Hamzawy, 2006).
However, a group of liberal and politic activists, academic professors, social
intellectuals, and writers functioned—utilizing the results of 9/11—to gain wide support
and communal encouragement of their demands for development. These groups were also
able to reach out to the moderate group of the Royal Family, which resulted in more
space and freedom for reformists. Their needs were focused on achieving more political
freedom, equal civil rights for both men and women, and equal opportunities for the
Saudi Sunni majority and the Saudi Shiite minorities in regards to social, public, and
political involvement and participation (Hamzawy, 2006). During this period Saudi
Shiites were appointed members of the shoura council, and more recently the first Saudi
Shiite minister was appointed (Alhaida, 2014).
With all the progress of the Saudi government led by King Abdullah, the leader of
the moderate group, the Saudi government benefits from the balance in power with the
Ulema. On March 11, 2011, pro-reform activists called for a day of rage was and asked
citizens to demonstrate around the Kingdom. The government was alarmed and ready to
react; prior to the demonstrations they responded to the calls for the day of rage and any
demonstrations to stop in order to avoid having a situation similar to the Egyptian
revolution. Earlier in February during a broadcast about the King’s financial aid program,
citizens were warned that the government would harshly respond to protestors. These
were not the only responsive actions taken by the government to demolish the calls for
the day of rage. The Senior Council of Ulema, the highest in ranks of religious authority
hierarchy in the Kingdom, declared in his statement that protests against the government
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is considered un-Islamic. This action by the government served to renew power between
the government and the religious establishment (T. C. Jones, 2011).
After the 2006 approval of limited sanctions on Iran, the U.S. policy increased its
pressure against Iran. In January 2007, Ali Larijani, the top nuclear negotiator for Iran,
met with King Abdullah. The purpose of the meeting was for Iran to ask Saudi to mediate
between Iran and the U.S. The letter was presented on behalf of the government of Iran
asking Saudi to communicate with the United States declaring Iran’s will to cooperate
with the U.S. Then, after a meeting with Condoleezza Rice and the Saudi Minister of
Foreign Affairs (Prince Saudi Alfaisal), the Saudi King subsequently refused. Alfaisal
made the announcement when he spoke with journalists and stated the Saudi Arabia’s
position refusing to be a mediator between Iran and the U.S. (Khalaji, 2007).
The king’s refusal came from his government urging Iran to act with precaution in
order to prevent a war in the Arabian Gulf area. These precautions and restraint may have
embraced Iran’s policy and involvement in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as Saudi authorities
believed that the Iranians were part of the Saudi Shiites’ violent attacks in Saudi.
Precautions also focused on Iranian military actions as it worried the GCC, Iranian
involvement in Lebanon, and the Iranian nuclear programs. The GCC already announced
their plans to collaborate in a peaceful nuclear energy program; this announcement was
understood by the Iranians as a reaction from the GCC countries to the Iranian’s nuclear
weapon program if executed. On January 16, 2007, the Foreign Ministers of the GCC,
Egypt, Jordan, and the U.S. met and agreed on the full support for the U.S. government’s
effort to stabilize the Iraqi situation by placating violent actions, endorsing the idea of
nationalism, and stopping the involvement of outsiders. The GCC countries did not take
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into consideration Saudi’s concerns about Iran’s involvement in Iraq as Saudi wished, as
the Iraqi Shiite were the ones in power, while Sunnis were marginalized minorities. The
Saudi government offered to Khalidzad, the Iraqi ambassador to the U.S., the information
about Almalki’s cooperation with Iran. However, the ambassador claimed that the
information provided was false (Mattair, 2008).
In November of the same year, King Abdullah stated to Cheney that Saudi Arabia
would continue to support the Iraqi Sunnis if the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq
caused any hostility to the Sunnis. In January the next year King Abdullah asked the
GCC countries to financially support the Iraqi Sunnis, Druze, and Christians in Lebanon
to resist the Iranians’ support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia also financially
supported Fatah in Palestine to lessen Iran’s effect over there. According to U.S. officials,
both Iran and Syria provided Hezbollah with long range missiles that could easily strike a
raid on Israel. Iran had allegedly warned the GCC countries that any attack on Iranian soil
from any of the U.S. military based in the GCC would result in a harsh backfire from Iran
against the GCC (Mattair, 2008).
Political, cultural, and religious reform are debatable topics in Saudi Arabia.
However, national, economic, and military securities are the elements of concern for long
term stability in Saudi Arabia. For this to occur, Saud Arabia must be able to secure both
men and women with jobs and proper education. Over the past fifty years Saudi Arabia’s
population grew from 3.2 million in 1950 to 28.1 million in 2008. The living conditions
of Saudis changed from being a village society to a modern one; the per capita income
jumped from quite a few hundreds of dollars to $19,800 per year in 2007. The young
Saudi men and women meet international education standards. Thirty-eight percent of the
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population is younger than 14 years old, while about 534,000 Saudis enter the workforce
yearly. In order for the Saudi government to support its population by securing jobs and
meeting the country’s development program, Saudi’s economy has to engage encounter
the international demand for Saudi petroleum products. The Saudi economy was affected
negatively by the drop in the oil price between the late 1990s and the beginning of the
new millennium (Cordesman, 2009).
Nevertheless, the Kingdom profited tremendously from the rise in oil product
prices between 2006 and 2008. The drop in oil prices in 1997 caused a drop in Saudi
export revenues from $33.38 billion to $32.66 billion and reached $44.98 billion in 1999,
but revenues started to rise. The year 2000 resulted in a revenue of $70.84, 2001 in
$59.92 billion, 2002 in $64 billion, 2003 in $82.41 billion, 2004 in $110.85 billion, 2005
in $161.71 billion, 2006 in $188.42, and 2007 in $196.7 billion. However, in the
following year in 2008 the revenues increased by 45.1% as it reached $285.5 billion.
Saudi Arabia has to continuously consider the shift and drastic changes that might occur
in the price of oil. The increase of oil prices that rose in 2003 was affected by the global
economic crisis in 2008; Saudi Arabia risked facing a drop in oil price that could reach
40% in 2009. Saudi Arabia’s budget must cope with these changes and consider military
and security funds, in addition to being able to generate jobs to support the Kingdom’s
economic stability. This is a critical issue for Saudi Arabia, as the economic crisis might
affect Yemen and Iraq and other poor countries within the region; the risk comes from
Iran’s reaction and ability to sustain oil export revenues (Cordesman, 2009).
Saudi Arabia is one of the most effective members of the OPEC oil cartel and the
world’s largest oil exporter. In 2001 the Crown Prince Abdullah, the current King, stated
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that oil would never be used as a political asset in the formulation of Saudi Arabia’s
policies balancing the interests between producers and consumers. Historically, for
example back in 1973, the Kingdom used its oil during the Yom Kippur War. Saudi acted
as an Arab leader among other Arabian oil producing companies to cut back oil supplies
and shipments to the U.S. In 2001, when Crown Prince Abdullah met with President
George W. Bush, he stated that if the U.S. did not change its position in support of Israel,
Saudi would change its oil policy towards the U.S. (Henderson, 2009). As the largest oil
exporter in the world, it takes two tactics to its oil policy. The first one is that the capital
Riyadh works on balancing the world’s oil market as Riyadh believes it is part of its
global responsibility to alter its oil production to meet other’s needs, which makes Saudi
oil production dependent on international demands. The second tactic is the political
advantage Saudi enjoys due its oil production. In other words, because of Saudi Arabia’s
oil reserves it is considered a U.S. foreign policy partner and is protected by the
government of the United States (Morse & Luft, 2003). Saudi Arabia has had two
concerns as an OPEC moderate member. It does not want to be considered as one of the
radical members as were Gadhafi and Khomeini and use the power of oil production to
raise oil prices by reducing production. On the other hand, the Saudi government does not
want to face the dilemma of OPEC obtaining the benefit of oil price increase, thus
harming the long term concerns of supply excess because the demand of Western
countries would decline (Rubin, 2003).
The importance of Saudi Arabia’s oil stems from the fact that it is one of the
world’s largest oil reserves, with the highest oil production, exports, and refining
capacity. Saudi Arabia owns 19% of the world’s oil reserves, 12% of the global oil
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production, more than 20% of the sales of oil in the global market, and a refining capacity
of up to more than three million barrels per day. The estimate of petroleum reserves in
the Kingdom is 264.6 billion barrels, to exemplify how large the Kingdom reserves are
by calculating its production rate in the next 80 years. Saudi Arabia is able to continue
production at a rate of 9.5 million barrels per day. In addition if Saudi takes its potential
and possible reserves into account it could continue production for more than 100 years,
not to mention that undiscovered resources might add several more years to the
production estimation. Saudi Arabia completed its increase in production plan to reach a
capacity of 12.5 million barrels per day.
The decision to invest more in the oil production came from the Kingdom’s
prediction of the future high demands on Saudi oil, and to express the Saudi desire to
maintain a reasonable spare capacity not less than 1.5 million barrels per day. The
Saudi’s past oil surplus production helped to continue the stability of the oil global
market, since Saudi cooperated by pumping more oil in cases of global oil shortages or an
unexpected rise in demand. The Saudi Arabia’s oil policy stems from its moderate,
consistent, and balanced approach, as its takes into account all international parties, and
the balance between current and future production. This approach focuses on
international cooperation, peace, economic development, and prosperity for the whole
world. The Saudi petroleum policy seeks to stabilize oil markets based on supply and
demand utilizing their enormous oil reserves. This enables Saudi to meet different
petroleum global demands in different seasons.
The kingdom seeks cooperation with other producing countries from within
OPEC and outside of it to ensure the sufficient availability of crude oil in the
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international market, while avoiding an excess supply that can lead to the collapse of oil
prices. The policy also seeks to maintain reasonable levels of petroleum product prices
that meet the interests of both producing and consuming countries (Ministry of Petroleum
and Mineral Resources, 2012).
The Saudi oil industry is confronted with domestic and international challenges;
these challenges have an effect on the position Saudi maintains and holds as a market
leader in the oil industry. The first challenge facing the country is the shift in demand
from America and Europe to East Asia. Secondly, the Kingdom’s leading oil supply
position globally can be changed by three factors: 1) new oil reserves in North America,
2) the threat from uncontrolled domestic usage of oil, and 3) Iraqi oil production increase
and huge spare capacity.
For Saudi Arabia to overcome these challenges it has begun to prioritize energy
efficiency as the main domestic source, while renewable energy will work in support of
current sources. Khalid Alfalih, head of Saudi Aramco the Saudi oil company, estimated
the increase in national energy from 8.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2028 which is
an increase of approximately 250%. However, this increase can be reduced by 50% if the
energy efficiency plans change and fuel subsidies end.
Saudi Arabia has been warned by Citigroup that within twenty years it may face
the possibility of transforming from an oil exporter to an oil importer because 25% of
fuel production in used nationally. This huge percentage is higher than the per capita in
industrial countries. According to the International Energy Agency IEA, the estimated
cost of energy subsidies including oil, gas, and electricity rates stood between $40 and
$45 billion in 2011.
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Currently there are significant domestic demands and rising calls to use clean
energy technologies that will help lessen the Kingdom’s energy dependency on oil, and
Saudi Arabia must move quickly towards this area. The second solution the Kingdom is
considering in order to overcome these issues is idea of using gas in order to lessen the
demand on oil domestically. Alfalih stated that in the next 20 years Aramco is going to
increase its gas supply by 250%. The country is also planning to embrace a solar project
investing $109 billion in the next two decades; solar systems will be more cost effective,
safer, and useful due to Saudi Arabia’s great solar source. The third option Saudi is
considering as an alternative for oil is the use of nuclear and renewable energy as a
domestic energy supply.
However, according to Citigroup, this is a risk for Saudi Arabia as a result of
shortage in expertise and high costs, and it has not been reported to be successfully
implemented in a desert environment. These three reasons resulted in postponing the date
Saudi chose to launch its nuclear project in 2019. The third solution is geared towards
Saudi sustaining its political and economic power of influence, and this is connected to
the spare oil production capacity. In comments about the Saudi spare oil capacity, Ali
Alnaimi, Saudi Petroleum Minister, stated that it “has been tapped to compensate for
production disruptions and declining supply from other major suppliers, and is a
cornerstone of the kingdom’s energy policy” (Al-Tamimi, 2012, para. 7).
In 2012 prices of Brent oil increased from $94 per barrel at the end of June to
$109 per barrel by mid- November. The sanctions on Iran resulted in demand shortage;
more than one million barrels per day of Iranian oil were off the global market. However,
the increase in price was not recovered by adding more Saudi and Iraqi oil into the
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market. In October of the same year, Saudi Arabia increased its oil production to produce
400,000 barrel per day (b/d) more than October in the previous year. OPEC’s
productivity in 2012 was higher by 1.2 b/d as it was able to produce a total of 31.2
million b/d in October 2012 while the total was 30 million b/d in October 2011. The loss
of Iranian oil from the market did not affect to output of OPEC in 2012.
The Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia after the Iranian revolution is based an
ideological and asymmetric conflict. Iran has used the Palestinian case and anti-Western
policy as a means to praise or criticize other Arab countries. Saudi Arabia is a close ally
to the U.S., and it depends on the U.S. for its security. Meanwhile, Saudi has struggled
with Iran to gain more influence and authority in numerous regional cases such as in Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestine, Bahrain, Yemen, and now Syria.
The Saudi fear from Iran having a nuclear weapon is not because of the direct
threat of the weapon; it is from the empowerment to Iran’s ferociousness in these
conflicted states. In the Gulf region, where Saudi Arabia is considered the largest state
and claims supremacy as it is considered a strategic region for Saudi, Iran will be able to
gain a more significant position with more authority and influence on smaller Gulf States.
Saudi Arabia’s position in the Middle East would put even more stress on the Royal
Family if Iran owns a nuclear weapon; a response from Saudi will be expected. There is
an additional fear factor to the aforementioned: Saudi is anxious about a U.S.-Iranian deal
that might conclude in a grand bargain. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are anxious
about Iran’s acquisition of a bomb, and equally fear a diplomatic agreement that both Iran
and the U.S. might reach.
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Saudi Arabia has publicly stated that it will call for a weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)-free zone in the Middle East. The Saudis believe that negotiations are not the
best practice to resolve this conflict and will only aid Iran with more time. According to
the WikiLeaks cables, King Abdullah requested that the U.S. “cut off the head of the
snake.” Saudi Arabia is uncertain about its preference in a military attack against Iran
nuclear facilities; it has stated once that Iran might react aggressively on the GCC states
and would only assure Iran to quicken the process of acquiring nuclear weapons
(Wehrey, 2012).
According to McInnis (2005), Saudi Arabia is overloaded with many
responsibilities, and a nuclear weapon is not one of them as it has a high risk of damaging
Saudi-U.S. relations. Though this statement is accurate with regard to the past
particularly prior to the end of Iraq’s Saddam Hussain where it was a Sunni dominated
state. And with regard to shifts of power where Iraqi Shiites are in power with a greater
chance for Iranian influence (Bokhari, Fidler, & Khalaf, 2004). However, this might not
be the current reflection of the Saudi desire. Mr. Chas Freeman, a former U.S.
ambassador to Saudi stated “Senior Saudi officials have said privately that, if and when
Iran acknowledges having, or is discovered to have, actual nuclear warheads, Saudi
Arabia would feel compelled to acquire a deterrent stockpile” (Campbell, Einhorn, &
Reiss, 2004, p. 129).
The Kingdom’s military capabilities are poor; this comes from incorrect choices
of weapons and arms, and poor strategic military planning regardless of all the
tremendous spending on defense during the invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s (Cordesman,
2004). An Iranian bomb would unbalance the security situation in Saudi Arabia; the poor
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circumstances of the military preparations as well as the large size of Saudi and its small
population makes it even more difficult to protect the Saudi territory (Mclnnis, 2005).
Rumors were spread from the early 1990s of Saudi Arabia’s efforts in acquiring a
nuclear weapon as a reaction to Iran’s (Amlin, 2008). However, the country does not
have any domestic resources to encounter a nuclear weapon; it needs technology
advancement in the field and expertise to enable the development of a plant (Lippman,
2011). Saudi Arabia has never functioned in a nuclear facility; Saudi experts and
scientists have no firsthand experience in enriching uranium for reactor fuel, in nuclear
fuel transformation, or in dealing with nuclear machinery. As the kingdom does not have
the human capacities to develop its own weapons, there are some international concerns
of Saudi purchasing it from another country. Pakistan is the most probable country Saudi
would seek out for a weapon, as it has the option to obtain fissile materials and receive
training from Pakistani nuclear experts (Almin, 2008).
Saudi Arabia has shown desire to engage in a peaceful nuclear energy project; in
fact, the GCC initiated the development of a peaceful nuclear energy program. In May
2008 Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum with the U.S. for nuclear energy cooperation
(Almin, 2008), as it also discussed a civil nuclear French collaboration (Pirot, 2008).
With Iran’s new president Hassan Rouhani, the Geneva talks that were held at the
end of November 2013 ended by an agreement. The negotiations continued for days
between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers, including the U.S., UK, Russia,
France, China, and Germany, who joined in diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the
Iranian nuclear issue. According to the White House, the agreement stated that:
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Iran should not enrich more than 5% uranium



Iran should allow more access to inspectors including daily visits to Natanz
and Fordo nuclear plants



Arak plant should stop its development as it is believed it produces plutonium



Sanctions on Iran will stop for six months,



Iran will receive sanctions relief up to $ 7 billion (“Iran Agrees to Curb,”
2013, para. 13-17)

This agreement will have an effect on the global oil market; Iran has the world’s fourth
largest oil reserves and second largest natural gas reserves. This deal concerns Saudi
Arabia, as U.S. companies will be interested in doing business with the Iranians. The
estimations of the added value Iran oil will contribute to the international market is about
800,000 oil barrels per day. Iranians are expected to offer cut rate prices to attract more
international investors, since the Iranians were banned from the market for years due to
the sanctions on Iran. European investors are also interested in getting involved with
Iranian oil (Salhani, 2013).
In 2011 Saudi Arabia increased its spending to $130 billion in a prevention
strategy aimed at stopping a social upheaval, while the break-even cost went up $98
billion. Saudi did not use its $700 billion of foreign reserves as its left for extreme
situations/cases. Chris Skrebowski, editor of Petroleum Review, stated that Saudi Arabia
might warn the U.S. by saturating the oil market with the needed amount of barrels, in
order to affect the U.S. shale oil revolution as the cost of production at U.S. shale is about
$80 billion. It is uncertain if the Kingdom has enough spare oil to do so, or if Saudi will
cooperate with any of the OPEC GCC members as other Arabs joined Saudi in the Arab
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oil embargo back in 1973. It is notable, however, that during the last decade Saudi Arabia
has been a responsible global member in the oil market and helped to maintain the price
of oil to guarantee a steady global oil market (Evans-Pritchard, 2013).
Iran
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia followed a cautious policy by giving the Iran’s policies time to form; in other
words, Saudi took a wait-and-see approach. After the cautious approach, King Khalid
sent a message with a high-ranking diplomatic delegation congratulate the establishment
of the new Iran. The diplomatic delegation was led by the Secretary General of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). King Khalid described the Islamic state of
Iran as a pioneer, and Crown Prince Fahd showed respect to the new leadership of Iran.
Although Saudi Arabia first approached the new Iran with political welcoming and
gestures of acceptance, Iran replied aggressively to Saudi. There were a number of
actions taken by the Iranian side against the Saudi government that escalated Saudi
concerns. Iranian authorities made a number of political statements against the Saud
Royal Family and the Hejaz region (the Western part of Saudi where both Holy Mosques
are located). In 1980, the Iranians organized protests during Hajj, the Islamic annual
pilgrimage which takes place in Saudi. These protestors held an anti-Western approach
against the American and Israeli policies.
Demonstrations in the Hajj season where Muslims around the globe gather to pay
their religious duties in a peaceful manner were a red flag for the Saudi government and
religious figures. Also, in this same year of 1980 in Tehran, groups of liberation
movement’s gatherings were combined with Saudi Shiites, and then were followed by the
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establishment of the Saudi Liberation Front in Iran. Two other factors fueled the Saudi
concerns: the seizure in the Holy Mosque by extremist Salafis in late 1979, and the
uprising of the Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 1980 (Sadeghi &
Amhadian, 2011). Even though Ayatollah Khomeini condemned the act of seizure in the
Holy Mosque by describing it as being supported by Americans and Zionists who both
were criminals (New York Times, 1979 as cited in Sadeghi & Amhadian, 2011), this did
not fully calm the Saudi government’s concern over Iran (Fuller & Francke, 1999).
The U.S. sanctions on Iran during the Khomeini period cost Iran a loss of $12
billion, although Iran was able to sell its oil at that time to non-American buyers, as well
as the oil purchased by American oil companies that bought Iranian oil and sold it to nonAmerican companies. It still would have benefited from the $12 billion it lost to face the
cost of the war with Iraq. The drop in oil prices and the Iraq-Iran war exceeded the harm
caused by the U.S. sanctions on Iran. The oil dropped from $40 per barrel in 1981 to
about $10 per barrel in 1986 and the Iraqi damage to the Iranian infrastructure had a great
effect on the Iranian economy, and U.S. sanctions cost Iran annually about $1 billion
while the war and oil drop price cost was in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
The policy Khomeini applied during the first post-revolution period created a
more ineffectual bureaucratic system and an incompetent oil dependent system. This had
a direct effect on raising the unemployment rates, inflation, corruption, and anemic rates.
Khomeini also called for growth in the population of Iran, which also resulted in a
catastrophe for the unprepared Iranian economy. The annual population growth reached
4% as about twenty million Iranians were born during the first ten years of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
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Labor laws were harsh on employers, and business owners and entrepreneurs
were not able to expand or feared to do so to escape the law imposed by the Iranian labor
law prohibiting elimination. To go around this law, employers hired Iranians on hiring
contracts instead of full employment. Yet, Khomeini was able to meet the social promises
of the Islamic Revolution. Iranians had the right to education and access to healthcare.
Healthcare staff, clean water, and vaccinations were recorded to reach major
improvements. The right to education was proven by the rising numbers of youth and
women’s literacy, as poverty reduced from 40% to 20% (International Campaign for
Human Rights in Iran, 2013).
The Iranian actions at the beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
statements shaped the reaction of the Saudis toward Iran and created a clear objective for
the Kingdom in forming its foreign policy with Iran at that time. Saudi Arabia fully
supported the Iraqis in the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980; publicly the Kingdom
remained neutral in its statements about the eight year Iraq-Iran war. However, there was
a believe that the Saudis were involved in the war since the Iraqi President Saddam
Husain flew to Riyadh to meet with Saudi officials to discuss and confirm his military
action plan (Sadeghi & Amhadian, 2011). The meeting that was held in Riyadh included
delegation from all Gulf States; during the meeting Saddam was confident that he would
be able to demolish the Khomeini government in a short period of time not longer than a
few weeks. This was not only Iraq’s estimation of the duration of the war considering
Iran’s capability to face a war; the U.S. had the same concept.
Harold Brown, the U.S. Defense Secretary, believed that the war was not major,
and the CIA predicted that the war would only last for several weeks. The U.S. military

66
plan was to not get involved unless Iran sieged the Straits of Hormuz. After the U.S.
announced its neutral position in this regard, Saudi Arabia called for American military
support to protect the Kingdom’s territory in case Iran retaliated. The Saudi fear of
Iranian retaliation was a result of the Iraqi military plan to use some Gulf States to strike
attacks against Iran. A week later, the Americans sent four Airborne Warning and
Control Systems to Saudi Arabia as a protective act from Iran and the Soviet. It was
understood that the U.S. sent planes to Saudi Arabia only to protect a friend. Saudi
Arabia requested U.S. protection since the Kingdom’s position was pro-war, and a
support for the Saudis was understood as an indirect support of the war, especially since
the U.S. Iranian relations were at stake due to the hostage issue with Iran (Tarock, 1998).
In May 1981, the Gulf States met in Riyadh to formalize the Gulf Cooperation
Council as a reflective response of the six Gulf States’ worries about the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were the only two countries who supported Iraq in the
war against Iran with economic, political, and military machinery, while the rest of the
Gulf States chose a midway approach with a slight shift to be on the Iraqi side (Sadeghi
& Amhadian, 2011). In 1982, at the twelfth Arab League summit King Fahd stated that
he discouraged the continuation of the war and only wished a peaceful solution that
assured stability for both countries (Al-Fadhil Zeid, 2000). However, Prince Fahd’s eightpoint plan to build peace in the Middle East by recognizing Israel as a state in 1981
created more tension in the Saudi-Iranian relations (Alkawaz, 2007).
The establishment of the GCC in 1981 was intended to strengthen the political,
economic, military, and security relations between the Gulf States. One of the main goals
behind this establishment was to unite the region in facing Iran, as the new Iran was
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implementing its idea of spreading and exporting the Islamic revolution to reach the Gulf
States by claiming Bahrain and other parts of the Gulf to be Persian. In 1983, Iran stated
its position against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States; Khomeini threatened in a public
speech to expand the war to reach the Gulf States as soon as the Iranians confirm the Gulf
States involvement in the war. In the years of 1985-1986 Saudi-Iranian diplomatic
relations witnessed some efforts to resolve the issue.
Prince Saud Alfaisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, visited Tehran to discuss a
number of unsolved matters between the two countries. Alfaisal met with Ali Velayati,
the Iranian foreign Minister, and exchanged their opinions about Iranian organization for
the demonstrations during Hajj, the Iraqi-Iranian war, and OPEC. Later on when Velayati
visited Riyadh, Saudi Arabia focused their conversations during the meeting on ending
the war in order to stop the Iranian revolution ideology from spreading in the region.
However, the talks between the two ministers failed to reach any developing point
(Alkawaz, 2007). The number of controversial topics only held both nations apart instead
of solving the root of the dispute (Sadeghi & Amhadian, 2011). After the failed talks
between Saudi and Iran, the Kingdom adopted a new strategy by fully supporting Iraq.
Saudi sold 280,000 barrels of oil to Iraq on a daily basis, partially paid for Iraqi
military equipment, allowed Iraqi to benefit from using Saudi ports to transfer their
equipment, and provided intelligence data to the Iraqi government. The Saudi response
did not stop at supporting Iraq; it also applied more pressure on Iran by lowering the price
of oil and raising its production. Mir Hossein Mousavi, the Prime Minister of Iran, stated
that the increase in Saudi oil production was unreasonable, because it was the reason for
collapse of oil price and threatened an Iranian reaction. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the
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speaker of the Iranian Parliament, threatened to completely stop Iranian oil exports and to
take actions against Saudi if it was proven that Saudi was behind the drop in oil price
(Alkawaz, 2007).
The policy Iran adopted in the years after the Iranian Revolution focused on
agitating propaganda directed at the Saudi policy as Iran named the Kingdom as the
American brand of Islam. Throughout the 1980s, Iranian Hajjis rioted during the Hajj
season in Saudi Arabia; the Hajj riots increased in 1987 when more than 400 pilgrims
were killed as a result of Iranian demonstrations. The Iranian government accused Saudi
of being responsible for the accident and demanded that both the Holy Mosques should
be handled by the Islamic Republic. After this event Saudi Arabia reduced the number of
visas issued to Iranian pilgrims. In 1989, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the
relations between Tehran and Riyadh started to improve under the leadership of Khatami
and Rafsanjani. In 1999, Khatami was the first Iranian president to visit Riyadh.
However, since the Iranian presidents do not have control over the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) and are under the influence and power of the commander in chief
which is the Iranian Supreme Leader, both Khatami and Rafsanjani were not able to stop
the IRGC from taking action in neighboring countries including Saudi Arabia. Since
1989 Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the Supreme Leader of Iran. Khatami’s effort to
reach out to Saudi Arabia and strengthen the relations between both countries is due to
the fact that the United States put more pressure on the Gulf States to eliminate the
Iranian power in the region. The U.S. took this position against Iran as a result of its
efforts to support terrorism and its nuclear program (Terrill, 2011).
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Tension and hostility controlled the Saudi Iranian relations during the period of
the Islamic Revolution to the Second Gulf War in 1991. The diplomatic relations between
both countries entered a new phase that calmed down the tension especially after the
accusation that Iran was exporting its revolution throughout the Middle East started to
fade. In 1990, Iran supported Kuwait and the Gulf States despite the position of the Gulf
States during the Iraqi-Iranian war. Both presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami worked on
establishing strong neighboring relations, particularly in the era of Khatami who
proposed the idea of Dialogue Among Civilization, openness to the world, and
normalization in relations with Arab States.
Khatami won two presidential terms; his focus was on the order of law, respecting
rights of Iranians, understanding the various views of the public, an approach for
extending international relations, and emphasis on women and youth. His policies
provided political liberation not offered since the Islamic Revolution, as both Culture and
Interior Ministries offered license to the establishment of dynamic press, as well as civic
and political associations. He also mandated the resignation of two intelligence ministers
while restricting a number of the ministry’s extravagances. He was also able to meet the
Iranians constitution article of local council elections that were never conducted prior to
his time in office (Bakhash, 2010).
The drop in oil prices forced Khatami to reduce investments; other than the drop
in oil price he had to divide his aides between economic liberalization and state control.
However, his second term came with more relief. The government took more logical
action to ease the hardship on Iran’s economy by simplifying the tax code, importing
regulations, unifying exchange rates, and allowing the entrance of private banks and
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insurance companies to the field for the first time since the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. The government also saved a share of oil revenues to enable funding for
investments and a rescue plan for hard economic times that might face Iran, as Iranian
state owned industries privatization continued (Bakhash, 2010).
Khatami also took a positive step towards international relations and Iranian
foreign policy by reaching out to the U.S. and the West. He was geared towards ending
the position of Iran against Israel and a pro-Arab Israel peace process. He also offered to
temporarily cut down the Iranian nuclear program to work on the negotiation process
with the West. However, his openness was considered controversial by the Supreme
Leader and IRG, as Karbaschi—the mayor of Tehran who helped Khatami in his
development plans—was jailed and accused of corruption. Newspapers were shut down,
and Sa’jd hajjarian who served as Khatami’s chief political strategist and advisor faced
an assassination attempt that resulted in him being disabled (Bakhash, 2010).
Rafsanjani planned to take Iran out of its isolation by taking practical steps; he
freed Iran’s economy from state control by allowing local and foreign investments. He
also provided more social and cultural freedom to women, young Iranians, and the
middle class. The shift was also very clear based on the free appearance of women in
social life; women were seen in public dressed up in bright colors and wearing makeup.
The government ignored the secretive selling of American movies, and art galleries were
open again. The Ministry of Culture adopted more liberal policies that included movie
production, theatre, art, books, and journalism. The freedom in culture and art provided to
Iranians resulted in the international prizes received by the Iranian film industry (Bakhas,
2010).
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Rafsanjani conducted a five year foreign development plan that was debatable;
the plan envisioned foreign borrowing and giving the private sector space for more
participation. The exchange rates were reduced from seven to three, there was relief on
the limitations on imports and foreign currency, price controls were stopped, statesubsidized goods lessened from seventeen to reach five, and a big number of state-owned
investments were offered to privatization. The Rafsanjani development plan resulted in
inflation and debt growth, due to large governmental spending, the policy of ease on
imports, and the foreign exchange exhaustion from currency controls. During 1994 and
1995 plans were modified as imports stopped and restrictions fell on private sector credit
and control over prices reoccurred. All these changes resulted in mass disappointments as
riots broke out in 1992, 1994, and 1995. By 1995, Rafsanjani tried to rebuild Iranian
relations with the U.S. by signing an agreement of $1 billion with the Conoco and
American oil company, yet Clinton during his administration banned American
investments in Iranian oil via U.S. sanctions (Bakhash, 2010).
In 2000, Israeli troops withdrew from southern Lebanon and that was considered
a major victory for Hezbollah, a strong ally of Iran. Hezbollah announced this victory as
a victory for both Iran and Syria; Arab States and people directed their support to
Hezbollah and its leader, Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia found itself in a situation where it had
to obey Arab political pressure and support Hezbollah. The spread of Shiites was what
worried Saudi Arabia as a result of Hezbollah’s popularity after the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon. In 2001, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a security agreement that formed
an important stage in the entire region of the Arab Gulf, and not just in bilateral relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It moved from the stage of diplomatic protocols to the
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stage of an established relationship on both diplomatic and social levels (Alkhateb, 2010).
The accord was signed in Riyadh by Prince Nayif (the Saudi Minister of Interior) and
Abdulwahid Musavi Lari (the Iranian Minister of Interior). Both countries agreed on a
number of articles in accordance with the laws and regulations of their countries. The
accord was formed in three main parts: economic exchange; science, cultural, and youth
sports exchange; and general ruling. The following points are to give a broaden idea of
the main part of the security accord: 1) The establishment of a security forum for
strategic dialogue between Iran and Saudi Arabia aimed at monitoring common dangers
that threaten the security of the two countries and the establishment of a joint mechanism
to counter these dangers, 2) Cooperation in fighting organized crime and falsifying
official documents, international terrorism, illicit enrichment, money laundering and
other, smuggling of weapons, smuggling of ancient pieces, 3) Cross border and maritime
rescue cooperation, 4) Cooperation against drugs trafficking, 5) Cooperation in training
security forces, the exchange of experiences, and security information, 6) Prevention of
illegal immigration, and imposing border control, 7) Cancelation of the Saudi decision
banning Iranians from performing Hajj and easing their visa process, allowing GCC
people to visit Iran without visas as long as the stay is no longer than three months, 8)
Increase in trade and manufacturing exhibitions between both countries by encouraging
exchange visits between economic, trade, and technical professionals in order to boost
trade, 9) Prevention of all aspects that might damage the economic relationship between
Iran and Saudi Arabia, 10) Cooperation in the fields of culture and youth sport, by
exchange programs, and 11) Establishment of a ministerial committee that will meet
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annually to work on developing progress between both Iran and Saudi Arabia (Altoraifi,
2012).
This resulted in highly sophisticated coordination and exchanged visits between
Saudi and Iranian top authorities. In 2003, Saudi Arabia did not recognize the new
government of Iraq because of the Shiite opposition who were able to take over the
government and received much support from Iran. Saudi Arabia’s argument was that the
new government was under occupation. This allowed Iran to be in a progressive position
with respect to the Iraqi government, especially since the Saudi clergies played a
magnificent role in widening the gap by publicly stating hatred of Shiites, and these
statements included criticism of Iraqi clergies. However, in the same year the Saudi
government realized the harm of escalating conflict between Sunnis and Shiites locally
and therefore, established a national dialogue forum to engage both Shiite and Sunni
religious figures in discussions.
In 2006, the Iranian Saudi relations entered a new diplomatic phase after the
election of President Ahmadinejad; hostility returned between both countries. Saudi
headlines accused Iran of exporting the Islamic revolution, sectarian conflict rose, Iran’s
nuclear program development was active, Iran’s role in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and
Iraq, and the presence of American troops in the Gulf region were the main topics that
continued to create intimidation between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Alkawaz, 2007).
An important aspect of Iran’s role in the Middle East region revolves around the
oil which was discovered in Iran in 1908 during the Shah regime. The Iranian
government at that time produced oil by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Between the
1930s and 1950s the company entered different phases of development and ownership. In
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1935 it was named Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), and in 1954 British Petroleum
(BP). Prior to the removal of Mohammed Mossadegh, the Iranian prime minster, in 1953,
many efforts to nationalize AIOC were made. These efforts of nationalizing oil
production in Iran caused a UK oil embargo on Iranian oil exports while putting more
pressure on Iran by trying to preclude Iran from selling oil to other countries. After the
removal of Mossadegh and the return of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi from exile, oil
production policies changed. Western companies including BP, Royal Dutch Shell, CFP
of France, and a number of U.S. oil companies signed an agreement with the Shah’s
government sharing 50% of Iranian oil net profit with the National Iranian Oil Company
(NIOC). Oil production was controlled by these foreign companies until 1973, as the
Shah was able to accomplish an agreement with the companies to nationalize their
resources.
Later, oil production control was passed to NIOC, and the British, French, and
American companies received privileged consideration and treatment for twenty years as
they were allowed to stay in Iran via contracts with NIOC. However, this agreement did
not continue for longer than six years, as the Shah was removed by the Islamic
Revolution in 1979. The new Iranian government ended all previous agreements and
contracts with foreign oil companies. The revolutionary Iranian constitution banned
concession to any foreign company to invest in Iranian natural resources, as all main
areas of Iran’s economy were brought under the control of the state. Throughout all of the
years of Iranian oil production it never reached the production peak that it did in the mid1970s. Iran was able to produce about 6 m/b/d, which was considered a great increase in
comparison to its production of 2 m/b/d in the 1960s. The political changes that followed
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the Islamic Revolution including the Iraq-Iran war created an unstable environment in
Iran; this instability affected Iranian oil production. By 2007 Iranian oil production
started to boost again by reaching 3.9 m/b/d. The absence of local and international
investment after the Iraq-Iran war played a role in the oil production decrease alongside
of other factors. The Iranian government took a step to appeal to foreign investors in the
1990s; their steps were geared towards the oil and gas sector by applying buyback
schemes. This structure allowed the government to work with foreigners in relation to
their natural resources without any violations of their constitution. However, Western
control and offers from the Iranian side were not appealing enough for foreign investment
to continue as Total, Statoil, and Eni discontinued their investments as European
companies in Iran (The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2012).
The first sanctions Iran faced from the U.S. were during the Carter presidency.
The sanctions were a reaction from the American government when fifty-two Americans
were held as hostages at the American Embassy in Iran. President Jimmy Carter in 1980
stopped the import of Iranian oil and froze Iranian investments and assets in the U.S.
worth approximately $12 billion. In a later stage the Carter Administration forbade all
trade and travel with and to Iran. These sanctions were removed when all American
hostages were freed. During the Reagan Administration in years 1983 and 1987, the U.S.
imposed new restraints on Iran’s imports and civilian goods that could be utilized for
military action. These sanctions were placed as the United States confirmed Iran to be a
terrorism sponsor state.
In 1995 President Clinton imposed more sanctions on Iran as it was still
considered a state sponsor of terrorism and with the growing fear of Iran starting to
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develop its own weapons of mass destruction. The new sanctions on Iran included a ban
of any American participation with the Iranian oil sector, but in 1997 President Clinton
cut off all types of investment with Iran. However, President George W. Bush during his
presidential period froze all business and foreign assets related to any form of support to
Iranian terrorism, or anything which could act as a threat disturbing Iraq stabilization or
by working or sponsoring the Iranian weapons program. During the Bush presidency the
U.S. government stopped “U-turn” financial transfers that have any involvement with
Iran. President Obama was acute with the topic of sanctions on Iran; Congress allowed
the Obama Administration to go further on these sanctions by banning the import of food
and carpet from Iran. They also allowed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) (S. Jones, 2013). The CISADA added
more sanctions to energy related activities that allow the act to connect the energy sector
to Iranian nuclear activity. The increase in sanctions was intended to put more pressure
on Iran, and to direct the government toward diplomatic talks and solutions as their
actions and non-compliance with the international community and obligations created
international concern (U.S. Department of State, 2011).
In May 2011, Obama’s sanctions reached Venezuela for trade between
Venezuela’s oil company with Iran, and in June of 2011 sanctions were proclaimed on
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. By the end of 2011 Obama agreed on a defense bill that
permitted the American government to terminate any type of business with any other
business that deals with Iran’s central bank (S. Jones, 2013). The goal of U.S. sanctions
on Iran started with the anticipation of forcing Iran to stop its support of terrorism and to
try to minimize or limit Iran’s influence in the Middle East, while from the mid-1990s the
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objective of U.S. sanctions against Iran shifted progressively to convince Iran to limit the
usage of its nuclear plan to a more civilian usage. From 2006 this concern became one of
the international community’s concerns, especially in 2010 when they joined the U.S.
with its sanctions against Iran to reach the intended goal (Katzman, 2014).
According to a 2007 economic report, the Iranian economy was facing many
problems; however, it did not reach the level of a catastrophe. The Iranian economy in
the past fifteen years showed a reasonable growth in its economy, the growth reached the
GPD and per capita investment growth. In 2004, 2005, and 2006 Iran reached an average
growth of about 5.8% (The World Bank, 2014). Poverty rates in Iran dropped since the
1990s; this drop remains due to governmental efforts and services. The issue of economic
inequality is not a main issue in Iran as it is stable and not progressing throughout the
country. However, unemployment is still a huge issue facing the Iranian government. Iran
suffers from the shortage of job offerings every year; there are about 300,000 to 500,000
new openings while there is an estimation of 700,000 job seekers every year. Fresh
graduates face a waiting period of two to three years in their job search, even though they
are educated. President Ahmadinejad delayed the economic and political reform initiated
by Khatami and Rafsanjani. Instead of focusing on one of the key factors of Iran’s
economic issues, Ahmadinejad concentrated on the nuclear program, and he also drained
the annual budget by approving projects that were never listed in the budget.
The population of Iran is skilled and well-educated, while the country has other
economic sectors that are growing such as manufacturing, agriculture, and the service
sector. The government has the manpower and a solid foundation for economic growth in
non-energy sectors. However, the political issues related to the Iranian economic reform
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are blocking this progress. For instance, the Iranian government has to lift the pressure
from private sectors and show more economic transparency (Campbell, 2007). In the
beginning of 2012 when the European Union enforced additional economic sanction
against Iran targeting the Iranian energy sector, the main goal behind these sanction were
not to affect the Iranian people but to weaken the funding source of the government and
the Revolutionary Guard.
The Revolutionary Guard is in control of the oil industry and the mainspring of
nuclear program. Iran is considered to have the fourth largest oil reserves and ranks the
second in gas reserves; this makes the energy sector the main source of Iran’s economy;
about 50-60% of the government’s revenues are from oil revenues. The EU exported 80%
of Iranian oil related materials in 2011; these materials are considered 92.4% of Iran’s
exports.
The smart sanction imposed by the EU was planned to have an effect on Iran’s
economy for two reasons. The first was banning any activities with Iran’s central bank,
and the second was the EU being the purchaser of 18% the Iranian crude oil exports. To
guarantee that Iran does not project its oil exports to the East, especially China, India,
Japan, and South Korea, the European ensuring companies, which are considered to be
the global leaders in this sector by ensuring a total of 95% of the world’s oil exports,
were banned by the EU to ensure Iranian oil shipments. Iran was able to rescue its oil
revenues from this dilemma with the help of China and India. By mid-2012, China traded
Iran a total of 12 super tankers with Iran. The tankers permitted Iran to transport its oil to
China. While India, the second Iranian crude purchaser, agreed to pay up to $50 million
to cover oil shipments from Iran to India. Japan also adopted sovereign guarantees to
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cover Iranian oil shipped to Japan, and South Korea adopted the a policy similar to China
by shipping Iranian oil to South Korea on Iranian ships.
Even though Iran put many efforts to escape the losses resulting from the EU
sanctions, they were not able to fully cover the damages of losing the EU. The Iranian
fleet was not able to function to the degree needed to export oil to China and South
Korea; the $50 million Indian guarantee was considered a partial coverage in comparison
the EU $1 billion coverage. This created a concern for the Indian refiners buying Iranian
oil. The sanction total effect on Iranian oil exports during the first year after the 2011
sanctions were between 20 to 30% less Iranian oil exports from China, Japan, South
Korea, and India.
The price of Iranian crude did not decline significantly as expected. However,
total revenues of oil in Iran declined by 50% as the numbers show that in 2011 the total
oil revenues in Iran were about $100 billion and dropped to $50 billion in the year after.
Furthermore the Iranian economy was affected by a number of factors, from sanctions on
the Iran central bank to the Iranian government not paying attention to the needs of
economic reform. These three factors played a great role affecting the people of Iran
financially; in 2012 the unemployment rate reached 20%, inflation in Iran was about
30%, and goods reached extremely high prices (Blockman & Waizer, 2013). The second
half of 2012 included further sanctions against Iran. In August 2012, the U.S. imposed
additional sanctions for Iran’s support to Syria which was in violation of the Human
Rights Act. The new sanctions added a ban on all energy-related services including
insurance services on shipping and oil and gas technology projects. On October 2012 the
EU reinforced more sanctions to harden the situation on Iran by banning all financial
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transactions between banks in Europe and Iran, yet financial transactions were permitted
if used for humanitarian purposes. Sanctions also reached the shipbuilding and oil storage
field as it banned all European countries from importing Iranian gas (The Economist
Intelligence Unit, 2012).
The Obama administration’s policy tightening economic sanctions on Iran with
the help of the EU was able to strike a progressive step in limiting Iran’s nuclear
program. In November 2013, the P5+1 countries and Iran were able to sign an agreement
after a three-day series of talks in Geneva. The first step that was taken in November of
2013, as an initial plan to the final outcome, consisted of a six month plan effective by
January 2014. The agreement entitled Iran to limit its uranium production while Western
countries would eliminate some of their sanctions against Iran, as a final agreement
between them is established. The nuclear production limitation will ease the international
community as it will prevent Iran from producing a weapon of mass destruction (Sciutto
& Carter, 2013). The initial agreement points were: 1) a $7 billion relief from financial
sanctions against Iran, 2) Iran will reduce its uranium production to 5%, this percentage is
normally used for energy production, 3) banning Iran from the production of 20% of
enriched uranium while neutralizing this percentage in the six month period, and 4) Iran
should allow and offer transparency to international inspectors visiting Iranian nuclear
plants (Karimi, 2014). Saudi Arabia and Israel have a different view on this dispute
resolution; they believe that this accord would only allow Iran to enjoy its nuclear
infrastructure thus, enabling Iran to build a nuclear weapon (Joshi, 2013)

81
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s View on the Arab Spring
Iran carefully monitors possible consequences that can be produced by the
revolutions and protests that have swept many Arab countries at the beginning of the
revolutions. In fact, despite the fact that Iran was one of the first regional powers that
welcomed what may be called the first waves of these revolutions, this situation gradually
changed when it stretched and reached to Syria, its ally in the region, to the degree that
Iran’s vision or position towards these revolutions is unclear.
Iran considered the initial efforts of these revolutions a success of its ideology,
since it provides evidence of the failure of the U.S. policy in the Middle East. Hence, Iran
not only affirmed their blessings to the Egyptians and Tunisians, it was considered a sign
of an Islamic wakening in the region inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution. As the
Supreme leader Ali Khamenei stated in his Friday sermon on February 4, 2011, that
Egyptians sought to coincide the overthrow of Mubarak with the thirty second Islamic
Revolution anniversary to signify the strength of the impact of the Iranian revolution in
its regional environment. The Quds Force commander, a unit from the Revolutionary
Guard, moreover stated that the waves of revolutions sweeping the region in Egypt and
other Arab countries were creating new “Irans,” united in their hatred against the U.S.
Iran believed that these regional developments put extreme pressure on their regional
opponents such as Israel by losing Mubarak, one of its top regional allies, leaving them
with narrowed alternatives. Israel lost one of their key strategic regional allies after the
overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt. Due to this loss, Iran will be able to gain more regional
power over their opponents. In addition, this expansion in Iran’s power and authority will
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reduce the effect of their opponents in putting pressure on Iran’s regional political spread
within the region.
When protests reached Bahrain, the Iranian government found it to be a great
opportunity for intervention and gaining more hegemony in the region. This proposed
power Iran is looking for would empower Iran in the region against other regional
powers, such as Saudi Arabia, that are refusing its nuclear program. Moreover, Saudi
Arabia received criticism from the Obama administration for its intervention in the
Bahraini crisis trying to resolve the dispute. This resulted in the Saudi foreign policy not
agreeing with the U.S. efforts in some regional issues such as the Syrian crisis.
At the Iranian domestic level, revolutions contributed to two developments. The
first development was the local demands to activate Iranian opposition calls rejecting
Iranian presidential election results, thus taking advantage of the Iranian government’s
position on the Arab Spring, because the demands that were raised from the Arabs were
similar to the Iranian ones, such as the fight against corruption, bribery, social freedom,
reduction of poverty, inflation, and unemployment rates. However, Iran realized the
danger of these renewed calls, and took aggressive action by repressing protestors and
controlling internet communication. It ended by putting Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi
Karroubi, the leaders of the movement, under house arrest. The Iranian government was
able to control these movements and stop them, since they lacked inner strength and it
seemed to be opportunistic. The protestors raised signs that are against Iranian support to
other international organizations such as Hezbollah and leaned more towards nationalism.
This criticism of the Iranian policy made the movement appear to take advantage of the
regional changes in order to address their political agendas.
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The second development was the division in the political system in Iran with
president Ahmadinejad on one side also described in Iran as the perversion part, and the
other team led by the Supreme leader and the clergies was the most influential group.
Ahmadinejad was trying to achieve two changes. The first was to activate more
presidential power as the representative of the executive power in the Iranian political
system. The second was to follow a more liberal and nationalist style; this new approach
would limit the role of the Supreme Leader and clergies, create more openness to the
West, and completely reduce reliance on Syria as an ally.
The first desire of the president of taking over the political decision was evident
during his attempts to completely manage the state affairs and overthrow some of his
rivals that hold governmental positions. However, these rivals are considered close to the
Supreme Leader, and the President’s efforts to take control of the office and government
are impossible. For instance, the Supreme Leader dismissed the president’s decision to
lay off the Minister of Intelligence, Heidar Moslehi, in April 2011. This action forced the
president to realize that his battle against the Supreme Leader is a huge loss. Although
Ahmadinejad appears to be religiously oriented in his political speeches, he seems to be
using a pragmatic approach to go forward in adding a new layer to the president’s battle
with the Supreme Leader’s group. This is already realized by the Supreme Leader as he
did mention that Iran can return to the parliament political system, meaning the
cancellation of the position of the president in the Iranian political system (Naji, 2013).
Iran’s holds a contradictory position on the Arab Spring. According to Tehran, the
Arab Spring is a continuation of the Islamic Revolution which happened in Iran 30 years
ago. However, this is not the case considering the Iranian position on the Syrian situation.
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The official position of Iran is in favor of the Arab Spring, since the Supreme Leader
Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad declared their support for revolting populations
and believed that the transformation of power in the region of the Middle East is an
extension of the Iranian Revolution that happened in 1978 and resulted in ending the
Shah’s regime following the Islamic awakening model that was created by the Iranians.
The Islamic awakening applies to the Egyptian revolution according to the Iranian
government as it was able to overthrow Mubarak, an ally to the West. Though the
position Iran is holding is questionable since it is stating that religion is the main factor of
these revolutions and the reason for power shifts in the region. And the optimism Iran is
enjoying is strengthening their political relations with these new administrations as
religious democracies. Neither the Tunisian revolution nor the Egyptian one was based
on religious demands, even though both countries ended up being ruled by parties
representing the political Islam. Both revolutions were asking for social and economic
reform; in Egypt the Islamic brotherhood party did not engage with other parties in Tahrir
Square from the very beginning. However, they became the party that influenced the
presidency’s leadership.
Comparing this Iranian position of supporting political change in the Middle East
as an extension of the Islamic awakening model in Egypt and Tunisia with the Syrian
revolution, puts Iran in a contradictory situation of owning two different reactions. The
Iranian government positions itself against the revolution by supporting Alassad,
disapproving of the Iranian position of supporting all uprisings in the region. These
contradictions frame Iranian actions as it supports the notion that the revolution does not
have an effect on its political alliances and regional security. Yet, it offers support in

85
countries where it will benefit from the change or this change will not have any type of
influence on Iran’s political system (“Tanagud Irani Hival,” 2013). This position held by
Iran in support of Alssad against the demands of the Syrian people, revealed the cover
Iran was hiding behind namely, their support of the oppressed people of Egypt, Tunisia,
Bahrain, and Yemen.
Iran’s position was clarified as pursuing a policy of expediency to protect its
strategic interests in the region while not adhering to the ideological frame imposed by
the Islamic Revolution. Nonetheless, President Mohamed Morsi is the first Egyptian
president to visit Iran since 1980 when political relations were broken. During the visit
there were no scheduled meetings with authority members in the Iranian government; it
lasted for hours and Morsi was to attend the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. The
Egyptian’s president spokesman stated that Egypt under this presidency will work on
strengthening its political relations with all countries. The U.S. government, however,
was concerned about this international engagement with Iran. This signals change in
Egypt’s foreign policy by not considering the concerns of the U.S. (Londoño, 2012).
In the beginning of 2013 Hossein Amor Abdollahian, the Deputy Minister of
Iranian foreign affairs in the Middle East, rejected the belief that Iran will get involved in
Egyptian policy and affairs. However, the Iranian news agency FARS stated that the
Iranian Supreme Leader sent a letter to Morsi to provide him with some advice on how to
establish and manage an Islamic state. Yet, this letter was denied by the Egyptians
(Gulhane, 2013). Political analysts posit theories of the possibility that Morsi had been
thrown as a result of his relationship with Iran. The visit of Ahmadinejad to Cairo was
not generally welcomed by the Egyptians as shoes were thrown at him in his visits to
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places in Cairo. The relationship was on the verge of collapse between General Sisi and
President Morsi when President Ahmadinejad visited Cairo (Greenfield, 2013).
According to the Iranian government, revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt happened
because their relation with the U.S. and Israel was not for the purpose of social,
economic, and political reform. Iran also implied that these revolutions are reflections of
the Islamic Awakening urging revolution in Iran (Ersoy, 2013). According to Khamenei’s
annual speech on the Persian New Year, Iran supported all revolutions and did not
differentiate between them using the basis of Shiite and Sunni majorities in these
counties. He supported his statement by mentioning Iran’s position in support of the
Palestinian case, and Iran stood in the same supportive position with Tunisia, Egypt,
Yemen, and Bahrain. However, two years after Morsi was elected president, he was
facing the Egyptian justice for providing intelligence and top secret Egyptian
governmental secrets to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Zarrabi-Kashani, 2014).
On January 26 of 2014, Tunisia celebrated its new constitution in a ceremony; the
Iranian parliament speaker, Ali Larijani, attended to represent his country in this
ceremony. During the ceremony Larijani made a statement accusing the U.S. and Israel
of standing in the way of democracy by destroying the democratized revolutions in the
region (“U.S. Walks Out of Tunisia,” 2014). Weeks after the ceremony President Rohani,
the new president of Iran, held a meeting with the envoy of Tunisia and described
Tunisia’s post-revolution as the democracy pioneers of the Middle East.
In the Libyan case, Iran took slow steps in recognizing the National Transitional
Council (NTC), Libya’s temporary government. Ramin Mehman-Parast, the Iranian
Foreign Ministry Spokesman, was happy for the Libyan population and congratulated
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them on the death of Qaddafi. Ali Akbar, Iran’s Foreign Minister, stated that Iran
delivered humanitarian aid to Libya during the revolution through the NTC as Iranian
support to the rebels. The Minister then traveled to Libya to meet with Mustafa
Abdeljalil, NTC former chairman, to emphasize the Iranian’s will to strengthen relations
with Libya by providing further aid to integrate building Libya’s infrastructure. And yet,
Irnanian-Lybian relations have only come this far since Iran has been pro-Alassad while
Libya is pro-Syrian National Council.
The diplomatic relations between Yemen and Iran were always at a low level, as
Yemenis blamed Iran for widening the gap between sects in Yemen as they aided Houthis
with arms. Houthis in Yemen are a group of Shiites located in the North region of
Yemen, who have been against the government. While the position of the Bahraini
government towards the rebels in Bahrain was highly criticized by Iran, Bahrain lately
took a more open practice by encouraging Iran to take thoughtful steps in the nuclear
negotiations held in Geneva in order to stabilize the Middle East.
Whereas the revolution in Syria holds a different scope in the Iranian foreign
policy, all other revolutions were mentioned by political figures in Iran. Yet, Syria was
rarely mentioned. Iran is a Syrian ally; it had been supported by arms, fighters, and
financial aid. The Syrian-Iranian relations can be traced back to the Iran-Iraq war, when
Hafiz Alassad, the President of Syria, supported Iran as the only Arabian political leader
to support Iran. Iran also would like to save and maintain the current Syrian government
to protect the Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah triangle (Zarrabi-Kashani, 2014).
Saudi Arabia has taken varied positions on the revolutions in the Middle East.
Sometimes the Kingdom used direct military intervention as was the case in Bahrain,
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while sometimes it used diplomatic intervention such as shutting down its embassy and
withdrawing of the Saudi ambassador and staff from Damascus. In the case of Tunisia,
Saudi Arabia was the only state to host the ousted Tunisian President Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali after the fall of his regime. However, in Egypt the Kingdom has cooperated with
the Egyptian military by providing financial support despite the close ties between the
ousted Egyptian President Mubarak and Saudi. According to Ulrike Freitag, the director
of the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, these divergent positions of Saudi
Arabia in relation to the Arab Spring is based on regional interests. She emphasized that
the political problem between Saudi Arabia and Iran is the key to understanding a lot of
these policies. However, Dr. Mohammed Alzulfa, a former member of the Shoura
Council, has a different view. According to him, Saudi Arabia constitutes a factor for
stability in the region. Their positions have not changed as they are committed to the
most important foundations of non-interference in the internal affairs of different
countries. Alzulfa explained the Saudi interference in Bahrain as it is a member of the
GCC, and according to the agreement between the GCC countries, military interference is
allowed if the state of security and stability of any of the members is threatened.
Furthermore, he provided a previous example, namely the Saudi intervention in Kuwait
during the Iraqi war on Kuwait in the 90s (Karam, 2011).
The Saudi position on the Tunisian revolution was explained by Jamal Khashoggi,
a U.S.-educated Saudi journalist. Khashoggi stated that Bin Ali will be treated in Saudi
Arabia as a political refugee not a president. Bin Ali will not be permitted to practice any
political action during his stay in the Kingdom or conduct any type of communication in
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order to arrange his matters in Tunisia, as the government of Saudi Arabia stresses its
position to be on the side of the people of Tunisia (“Bin Ali Yumdi Yawmahu,” 2011).
Whereas the Saudi position varied, from the second day of the Egyptian
revolution on January 26, 2011, Prince Turki Alfaisal, the Director of the Saudi
Intelligence, criticized Mubarak’s regime. He stated that the future of the Egyptian
president relies on the ability of Egyptian government leaders to understand the needs of
the people demonstrating. However, when Mubarak was in the critical situation, the
Saudi King Abdullah declared his support to the president. The highlight of the Saudi
position comes when King Abdullah warned the Obama administration that the Kingdom
will provide Egypt annual financial aid if the American pressure on Mubarak to stepdown does not stop. However, Saudi Arabia realized its position and welcomed the fact
of a peaceful transfer of power, after Mubarak was overthrown. The Saudi government
also provided financial aid to help the Egyptian caretaker government to recover from its
economic crisis (Salamah, 2011). On July 3, 2013, President Morsi was ousted from
office by General Sisi, the Chief General of the Egyptian army, after public demands.
Two hours after the announcement of the overthrow of president Morsi, King Abdullah
issued a public announcement congratulating the new Egyptian president, Adly Mansour,
who was appointed by the army. After the public announcement of the Saudi position,
King Abdullah called General Sisi which was also announced publicly (Riedel, 2013).
After removing Morsi from power, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provided
Egypt with a $14 billion financial aid, as the two countries promised to send $40 for
economic aid (Neriah, 2013).

90
In the case of Yemen, Saudi Arabia collaborated with the GCC and met with
Saleh the Yemeni president and his opposition in Riyadh to seal a deal between both
parties. The negotiation process ended with a signed settlement. They agreed that Saleh
would hand over his power to his deputy in return for not facing legal prosecution
(Sharqieh, 2013). However, during the demonstrations in Yemen, King Abdullah hosted
Saleh in a hospital in Riyadh for three month to receive treatment, and this hurt so many
Yemeni people. After the end of Saleh’s presidency period, Saudi Arabia changed its
policy towards Yemen, because it wanted a strong Yemen instead a weak one. In 2012
Saudi sent financial aid twice; the first time was $3.25 and the second was $1 billion to
stabilize the Yemeni currency. Yemen’s dependence on Saudi Arabia after Saleh allows
Saudi Arabia to have further influence in the country (Stenslie, 2013). In Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia sent approximately 1000 troops to Bahrain as a response to the request of the
Bahraini kingdom. The United Arab Emirates also sent troops to Bahrain. Troops
cooperation is part of the GCC agreement between the Gulf States. The purpose of
sending troops from the Gulf States is to protect gas and financial facilities in Bahrain
(“Gulf States,” 2011). The Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain was faced by the
denouncement of the Bahraini opposition. The members of the ruling family in Bahrain
were Sunnis whereas the majority members of the population were Shiites; the uprising
was an opportunity to remove the Sunni ruling leaders. However, Gulf States fear any
divisions or weakening in Bahrain’s political system in order to protect their own states.
The fear is also from Iran gaining more influence in Bahrain if the majority Shiites
gained more political power. This influence would allow Iran to have a base point to
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attack its biggest rival, Saudi Arabia, utilizing the causeway that connects Bahrain to
Saudi Arabia (Murphy & Khalifa, 2011).
However, the Saudi position on the conflict in Syria is different; this position is
reasoned to end the Syrian-Iranian coalition and to not repeat the Saudi experience in
Afghanistan. The Saudi clerics called for jihad in Syria by encouraging Saudi youth to
get involved in this revolution as it is a war against Shiitisim and Alawite ruling power
(Wagner & Cafiero, 2013). Earlier in 2012, Saudi Arabia attended the Friends of Syrian
conference in Istanbul and was in a supportive position to the idea of arming the Syrian
rebels (Barnard, 2012). According the Wall Street Journal, Saudi Arabia was pressuring
the Jordanian government to allow Saudi arms aid to enter Syria via Jordan’s boarders
(Abi-Habib, 2012). However, the government of Jordan denied that this request ever
happened from the Saudis (Barnard, 2012). In 2014, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
issued a decree stating a punishment up to 20 years of jail against any Saudi citizen who
gets involved in any war outside the Kingdom, while the same decree stated a
punishment of up to 30 years in jail against any Saudi who joins or supports any terrorist
group. This decree was issued as the Saudi government fears the danger of radicalizing
Saudi youth by participating in such wars (“Saudi Arabia: Decree Lays Out Penalties,”
2014).
Findings
From the data collected about Iran after the Islamic Revolution and Saudi Arabia,
the key points were specified and coded. The key points from the data collected were
appointed as A, B, C, …I. Additionally, the numbers 1, 2, 3, were used in relation to the
different periods of the bilateral relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. To illustrate the
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concept used by the researcher, A-1 refers to the first point from the first period
investigated (A). The table demonstrates using three columns; the left column contains
the identifiers of the key points, the middle column contains the exact text, and the right
column contains the codes.
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Table 1
Emerging Themes and Coding
ID

Key Points

Codes

C-1

Since its formation in 1932 Saudi
Arabia adopted a steady pro-West
foreign policy; this policy included
development in politics, economics,
and military dependency with the
U.S.
Iran was looking for more
independence, adherence to an antiimperialist ideology, and
opportunities to create more stable
political relations with the Third
World.
The Grand Mosque seizure projected
a new opposition model into the
Saudi government. This group not
only sought a ban on women’s social
involvement, but they also sought
bans on television broadcasting and
movies, as well as strict obedience to
Sharia law. They forced religion into
politics by accusing the Royal
Family of not being religiously fit to
rule the Kingdom.
As a result of this arrangement, all
anti-regime activity was discontinued
by the Saudi Shiites in Saudi Arabia
and overseas. From the King’s side
the government promised and started
to ameliorate Shiite treatment, to
provide funding for development
plans and projects to improve their
living conditions, and stopped
Wahhabi leaders from agitation
against the Shiites. Fahd also went a
step further and promised all Shiite

relations with the West, foreign policy,
West dependency, seek power

A-1

B-1

B-1

independence, seek power, anti-West

opposition, women, freedom, equality,
technology, religion, Sharia law

agreement, improvement, Shiite,
development, living standards,
discrimination, safe, welcome, equality,
religion, Wahhabism
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A-1

D-1

C-1

D-2

D-2

E-2

political exiles that they would be
respected and never harassed upon
return to Saudi Arabia.
The Gulf States met in Riyadh to
formalize the Gulf Cooperation
Council as a reflective response of
the six Gulf States’ worries about the
Islamic Republic of Iran.
Iran stated its position against Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf States;
Khomeini threatened in a public
speech to expand the war to reach the
Gulf States as soon as the Iranians
confirm the Gulf States involvement
in the war.
Fahd had to make a critical decision
to allow U.S. troops to enter Saudi
Arabia.
In 1989, after the death of Ayatollah
Khomeini, the relations between
Tehran and Riyadh started to
improve under the leadership of
Khatami and Rafsanjani. In 1999,
Khatami was the first Iranian
president to visit Riyadh.
Saudi Arabia never disconnected its
diplomatic relations with Iran even
under the worst conditions. These
Saudi efforts started to pay off, and
President Rafsanjani made the first
Iranian attempt to strengthen the
relations. The Iranians stopped the
support of Saudi Shiite uprisings, as
well as the Iranian attacks against the
Royal Family, as the Iranian’s also
stopped supporting rioters during the
season of Hajj.
In 1995 President Clinton imposed
more sanctions on Iran as it was still
considered a state sponsor of

GCC, formation, power, agreement,
security, defense, plan, future, fear,
cautious, policy

enemy, fear, security, war, power,
defense, policy, threat

military, West dependency, power,
security, fear
new era, improvement, policy, bilateral
relations

cautious, political relations, decision,
improvement, leadership, opposition,
domestic security

sanctions, economic, effort, foreign
policy, nuclear, terrorism, U.S.
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B-2

D-2

B-3

F-3

terrorism and with the growing fear
of Iran starting to develop its own
weapons of mass destruction. The
new sanctions on Iran included a ban
of any American participation with
the Iranian oil sector, but in 1997
President Clinton cut off all types of
investment with Iran.
Khatami was a reformist; however,
as the Iranian political system is
intertwined and complicated, he had
to face the common conservatives
and their right to veto as members of
the clerical councils and the Supreme
Leader Khamenei. More press
freedom was approved by reformists
while the conservative authority
would shut down newspapers and
arrest political critics. Khatami also
started to build good relations with
the West.
Both countries agreed on a number
of articles in accordance with the
laws and regulations of their
countries. The accord was formed in
three main parts: economic
exchange; science, cultural, and
youth sports exchange; and general
ruling.
King Abdullah, the current king,
leads the moderate group as he
appeared to encourage steady and
gradual openness and more
involvement of citizens in politics
limited to the fact that this
involvement and freedom does not
interfere with the supremacy and
stability of the Royal Family.
The year 2002 shows a change in the
Saudi religious establishment. The

development, control, power, religion,
freedom, U.S., influence

development, diplomatic improvement,
leadership, exchange, foreign policy

freedom, social equality, religion,
control, stability

religious power, shift, openness,
demolish, equality
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B-3

E-3
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actions of the moderate group of the
Royal Family created dissatisfaction
within the establishment. Clerics
have always voiced their opinion of
the risk of political openness. The
Ulema enjoyed an escalation in their
own power right after the golden
liberal Saudi years ended in 1960.
Earlier in February during a
broadcast about the King’s financial
aid program, citizens were warned
that the government would harshly
respond to protestors. These were not
the only responsive actions taken by
the government to demolish the calls
for the day of rage.
After the 2006 approval of limited
sanctions on Iran, the U.S. policy
increased its pressure against Iran. In
January 2007, Ali Larijani, the top
nuclear negotiator for Iran, met with
King Abdullah. The purpose of the
meeting was for Iran to ask Saudi to
mediate between Iran and the U.S.
Precautions also focused on Iranian
military actions as it worried the
GCC, Iranian involvement in
Lebanon, and the Iranian nuclear
programs.
King Abdullah asked the GCC
countries to financially support the
Iraqi Sunnis and the Sunni, Druze,
and Christians in Lebanon to resist
the Iranians’ support of Hezbollah in
Lebanon. Saudi Arabia also
financially supported Fatah in
Palestine to lessen Iran’s effect over
there. According to U.S. officials,
both Iran and Syria provided
Hezbollah with long range missiles
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that could easily strike a raid on
Israel. Iran had allegedly warned the
GCC countries that any attack on
Iranian soil from any of the U.S.
military based in the GCC would
result in a harsh backfire from Iran
against the GCC.
The American presence in countries
surrounding Iran escalated the
insecurity in Iran, as a result, the next
presidential elections were controlled
by the Iranian conservatives, and
Ahmadinejad was elected president.
Iran’s urge to own its own nuclear
weapons and infrastructure to
empower its position in the region as
the Iranian authority and elite proves
that the country is facing security
obstacles and seeks to be in a leading
position in the Middle East.
President Obama was acute with the
topic of sanctions on Iran; Congress
allowed the Obama Administration
to go further on these sanctions by
banning the import of food and
carpet from Iran. They also allowed
the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
Accountability, and Divestment Act.
This agreement will have an effect
on the global oil market; Iran has the
world’s fourth largest oil reserves
and second largest natural gas
reserves. This deal concerns Saudi
Arabia, as U.S. companies will be
interested in doing business with the
Iranians. The estimations of the
added value Iran oil will contribute
to the international market is about
800,000 oil barrels per day.
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The Obama administration’s policy
tightening economic sanctions on
Iran with the help of the EU was able
to strike a progressive step in
limiting Iran’s nuclear program. In
November 2013, the P5+1 countries
and Iran were able to sign an
agreement after a three-day series of
talks in Geneva.
Iran considered the initial efforts of
these revolutions a success of its
ideology, since it provides evidence
of the failure of the U.S. policy in the
Middle East.
This proposed power Iran is looking
for would empower Iran in the region
against other regional powers, such
as Saudi Arabia, that are refusing its
nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia received criticism from
the Obama administration for its
intervention in the Bahraini crisis
trying to resolve the dispute.
The Islamic awakening applies to the
Egyptian revolution according to the
Iranian government as it was able to
overthrow Mubarak, an ally to the
West. Though the position Iran is
holding is questionable since it is
stating that religion is the main factor
of these revolutions and the reason
for power shifts in the region.
The Iranian government positions
itself against the revolution by
supporting Alassad, disapproving of
the Iranian position of supporting all
uprisings in the region. These
contradictions frame Iranian actions
as it supports the notion that the
revolution does not have an effect on
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its political alliances and regional
security. Yet, it offers support in
countries where it will benefit from
the change or this change will not
have any type of influence on Iran’s
political system.
In the case of Tunisia, Saudi Arabia
was the only state to host the ousted
Tunisian President Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali after the fall of his regime.
However, in Egypt the Kingdom has
cooperated with the Egyptian
military by providing financial
support despite the close ties between
the ousted Egyptian President
Mubarak and Saudi.
The highlight of the Saudi position
comes when King Abdullah warned
the Obama administration that the
Kingdom will provide Egypt annual
financial aid if the American pressure
on Mubarak to step-down does not
stop. However, Saudi Arabia realized
its position and welcomed the fact of
a peaceful transfer of power, after
Mubarak was overthrown. The Saudi
government also provided financial
aid to help the Egyptian caretaker
government to recover from its
economic crisis.
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The data was divided into three time frames and the Iranian and Saudi position
towards the Arab Spring. The first time frame includes the first Iranian presidential
period after the Islamic Revolution and the Saudi government at the exact time. The
second time frame embraces the period of both Presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani and
the Saudi government ruling the Kingdom during the same period. The third time frame
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consists of President Ahmadinejad and the Iranian current President Rouhani, and the
Saudi current King Abdullah. The last part of the analysis explains the positions of both
Saudi Arabia and Iran during the Arab Spring. Analysis of the qualitative data follows a
process that includes sorting, reorganizing, and restructuring the mass of the data
collected (Patton, 2002). From an additional standpoint, Schatzman and Strauss (1973)
state that “probably the most fundamental operation in the analysis of qualitative data is
that of discovering significant classes of the things, persons and events and the properties
which characterize them” (p. 110).
For the analysis of this research, the researcher employed qualitative analysis
stages. The first step was data reduction: rationalizing and sieving non-practical data.
Data reduction is used with caution and balance to avoid losing vital information, and to
avoid misdirecting the results. Systemic categorization and coding were adopted to assure
the validity of the analyzed data. The second analytical step was categorization; in this
step the researcher was able to cluster observed patterns from the data to meaningful
classifications. The clustering tool is used after the formation of codes within the analysis
process. Categorization provided identification of indigenous typologies from the
political systems of both Saudi Arabia and Iran throughout the examined period. This
process involved determination to highlight the explicit and implicit of diplomatic
relations, political action, social needs, and regional positions taken by both Saudi Arabia
and Iran.
First Time Frame
Saudi Arabia during the Islamic Revolution was on the side of existing
government; Saudi announced and took this position publicly. The Saudi position was
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one of fear of the new Iran, especially as it concerned Iran’s ability to impact and
potentially change the region in the future, as well as the need to stop the bloodshed.
Saudi Arabia acted as a regional power by stating these points; however, it did not state
the Saudi worries over the formation of a new Iran and the threats that might come along
with it. Saudi Arabia’s support to the Shah shifted after the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, though this shift was not a quick one. The Saudis took their time until
the government announced its entire support and congratulated the new Iranian
government. This shapes a clear picture of how Saudi Arabia positions itself with other
countries in regards to revolutions and governmental changes with neighboring countries.
The Saudi government does not favor political change with neighboring allies, yet it is
vividly clear that their position changes as developments on the ground progress. The
wait-and-see policy practiced by Saudi Arabia during the Islamic revolution has been
used in other situations with other governments as the analysis will describe later. Even
though the Saudi government did congratulate the Iranian government by sending a
prestigious delegation to the new Iranian government, Iran did not accept this gesture.
Iran and Saudi already had their shared fear and ideological differences, and their
interpretation of Islam as well as relations with the U.S. and the West were enough
reasons for Iran to not accept the gesture. There was a trust issue that should have been
resolved from the very beginning.
Iran desired to set the base of its relationship with Saudi and show its capabilities;
the Iranians wanted to create a clear image of where they stand in regards to their Saudi
neighbor. Not accepting King’s Khalid welcoming gesture resulted in a number of
incidents. Statements against the Saudi Royal Family were made by Iranian officials, Hajj
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protests were organized, and the Saudi Liberation Front was created in Iran. The different
interpretation of Islam between both countries and the Saudi’s loyal friendship with the
U.S. instilled an Iranian perspective that the Saudi Royal Family was unworthy of being
the custodian of the two Holy Mosques in Saudi. For the Iranians to inspire others to
believe in their ideas, they had to take some actions. Publicly they announced their
position, as they also supported the Shiite Saudi minority in the Eastern Province of
Saudi Arabia.
The position Iran took after the Saudi government congratulated the Islamic
Republic of Iran as a pioneer escalated the threat to Saudis. Saudi Arabia reacted in a
diplomatic manner. It formed a new power against Iran aggressiveness. In 1981, Saudi
Arabia initiated the idea for the GCC to form an entity for security, and military and
economy wellness. This idea was quickly developed and executed as the Republic of Iran
changed its relation with all the GCC countries, not only Saudi Arabia. The same thing
happened during the Iraqi war on Iran; Saudi Arabia did not react immediately. At the
beginning the government held a neutral position towards the war, which was the same
approach after the formation of the new Iran. Even though it was believed that the
Kingdom is involved in supporting Iraq, this was not what was publicly announced by the
Saudi government. The neutral position was taken by the Saudis until the announcement
of U.S. neutrality; after this announcement the Saudi government requested protection
from the United States, since Saddam’s announced military plan was to use some Gulf
territories to strike Iran, and this was the reason for Saudi’s fear of Iran.
Demonstrations in Saudi were treated differently by the Saudi government. The
social demonstrations by the Shiites in Saudi Arabia were dealt with positively. The
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government responded to the Shiite minorities in Saudi with living improvements. Even
though progress and development were executed in stages, no one can ignore the fact that
the Saudi government responded to their calls for improved living situations. These
improvements covered different aspects of life, such as securing jobs, providing proper
education such as the education provided to Saudis in other parts of the Kingdom, and
providing health services. On the other hand, the demonstrations during the Hajj season
were treated differently; to end the incident the government got involved with the use of
power. As a result, a number of Iranians, Saudis, and pilgrims were killed due to this
demonstration. The demonstrators held posters and signs of Khomeini and Palestine, a
sign of support to the Islamic revolution, which is considered a direct threat to the Saudi
government and its foreign policy.
However, this was not the case with the other demonstrations that happened in
Makkah. It was not Shiites who seized the Holy Mosque, but rather it was done by Saudi
Sunnis. The demands were different; Juhaiman, the leader of the seizure, demanded the
fall of the Saudi Royal family. This Sunni group of 500 people gathered in the Holy
Mosque and demonstrated against the government; they did not ask for social or political
reform. They wanted a different level of change—a change in the ruling authority. In
Juhaiman’s view, the Royal Family was not legitimate and not worthy of holding this
honorary position and responsibility amongst the Islamic states due to their different
interpretation of Islam, relations with the West, and corruption. The Saudi government
responded with military action against Juhaiman and his group, and executed all men
involved in this incident. The Saudi government did not respond to both demonstrations
based on whether they were Sunnis or Shiites; the governmental response was based on
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the demands and actions each group took. Even though the Shiites in the Eastern
Province of Saudi were supported by the Iranian government, when governmental action
was taken, the Iranian support was not taken into consideration as much as the actions
and demands of the protestors.
The U.S.-Saudi relations are one of the most important aspects of the Iranian
actions towards Saudi. The Republic of Iran aimed to build political relations with third
world nations instead of having strong relations with the West. While Saudi Arabia is a
great ally of the U.S., this political relation is not accepted by the Iranian government and
is considered one of the reasons why the Saudi Royal Family is not a legitimate
government for the country. There have been a number of actions taken by the Saudis
that triggered a reaction from the Iranians, including the support Saudi asked from the
U.S. during the Iraqi war on Iran and this continuous steady relation with the U.S.
Although the Israeli Palestinian conflict was not solved and new developments were
occurring during this time, such as the peace treaty that was signed between Egypt and
Israel which resulted in ending the Saudi Egyptian relations, the Western influence on the
Saudi society included education and technology development, as well as military and
economy dependency on the U.S. Iran holds a clear position against Israel and does not
affiliate its foreign policy with governments that support or have diplomatic relations
with Israel. Both the Hajj riots and Juhaiman’s uprising happened using the Saudi-U.S.
relation as an excuse.
The Iranian oil policy prohibited any type of trade with any foreign investor when
it comes to its natural resources. Khomeini was known as a radical OPEC member.
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Meanwhile, the Saudi oil policy partnered with the U.S. foreign policy and altered its
production to meet international demands.
The economy of Iran during Khomeini faced a number of dilemmas, including
U.S. sanctions, the drop in oil prices, and the Iraq-Iran war that harmed the Iranian social
and oil infrastructure. The Iranian population faced employment issues even though
governmental plans aimed to provide job security. However, other crucial needs were met
by the Iranians such as healthcare developments, the right to education, and poverty rate
reductions. On the other hand, King Khalid’s economic plan was a historical changing
point in Saudi Arabia. Growth and progress touched all aspects of society, thus moving
Saudi to a more modern state. Commerce, education, healthcare, and employment all
benefitted from huge positive changes.
Second Time Frame
The next era which includes President Rafsanjani and President Khatami was the
best period in the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic relation based on the literature review. Right
after the death of Khomeini the scope of the relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia took
a different direction. Progress started to occur on both sides. During the Iraqi war on
Kuwait in 1991, Iran was against Iraq and sided with the Gulf States. This was evidence
of improvement on the Iranian side. Rafsanjani did not just settle with the new Iranian
position in supporting the Gulf nation during the war; he went even further in establishing
peace. He stopped many tactics Iran previously used; he stopped the support of Saudi
Shiites uprisings, attacks on the Saudi Royal Family, and the Iranian support of the Hajj
riots. Both countries also agreed to cooperate on the level of OPEC to request oil
production to reduce in 1997. Iranian airlines started to fly to Saudi Arabia in 1997 as
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well. A high joint committee between Iran and Saudi Arabia was founded to activate
trade and economic cooperation, and annual meetings were held up until the year 2001.
In 2000, the volume of exchange between the two countries reached $500 million. The
ban on Iranian visitation Saudi outside of the scope of pilgrimage was removed, and they
were granted access to the country once again, while Saudis were allowed to enter Iran
with no need of a visa as long as the stay was no longer than three months. In 1999, the
first Saudi expedition in Iran happened in reply to the three Iranian expeditions in Saudi.
Both Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed that the Palestinian conflict was a major topic of
consideration. However, each country took its own path in supporting the case; Iran
supported by providing material and moral support to the Armed Islamic resistance
groups Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, while Saudi Arabia supported the
case by more peaceful tactics such as the eight point peace plan proposed by King Fahd
in 1981. In 2001, the Iranian-Saudi relations took an advanced progress, and a security
agreement was signed. The agreement consisted of eleven points that covered many
aspects not only including security but also cultural, economic, and sport program
exchange.
Other than progress between both countries, this era also witnessed some
diplomatic actions from both countries that refer to hegemony in the Middle East. King
Fahd acted as the mediator and peace builder in the Middle East. He restored the SaudiEgyptian relations; this had an effect on the image of Saudi in the Middle East. Saudi also
succeeded in saving the Lebanese conflict in 1989 by ending it in a peaceful manner, as
Saudi invited the Lebanese authorities to Saudi and held a meeting to resolve the conflict.
In 2003, Saudi established a forum for national dialogue to grab both Sunnis and Shiites
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in Saudi and move them closer. On the other hand, Iran supported Hezbollah in Lebanon
which had direct efforts in freeing Lebanon from the Israeli occupation. This changed the
Middle East’s view on Hezbollah which became a hero, and which also positioned Iran in
a positive position as it supported Hezbollah. Iran also proposed the Foundation for
Dialogue among Civilizations; the foundation was actually founded in 2007.
Although many positive diplomatic actions were made and progress was
witnessed during this time, there were pressures on both Iran and Saudi Arabia that had
an effect on the functionality of their relationship. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps (IRGC) had more power over the Iranian presidents, and this was to some degree
holding up the progress. This power affected Iran’s foreign policy and domestic policy,
as the power of conservative authority in Iran was against the freedom provided to the
press by Khatami, the Iranian reformist president, while the 9/11 events had a different
type of power on the Saudi-Iranian relations, and the Iranian U.S. relations. It harmed the
outstanding efforts of president Khatami to strengthen the Iranian relations, and the U.S.
put pressure on the GCC nations to eliminate Iran as powerful nation in the region. The
U.S. sanctions on Iran had another type of pressure on Iran, however, since it shifted
from pressuring Iran by limiting its support of terrorism which limits its affect in the
Middle East according to the U.S. foreign policy to limit Iran’s nuclear activity, despite
the fact that Iran wants to strengthen its regional position by establishing an Iranian
nuclear program.
The drop in oil prices effected Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran was forced to limit its
investments during Khatami’s first presidential term, and it affected the function of social
governmental programs and services by limiting funds.
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During this period of time both Iran and Saudi Arabia allowed the private sector
to help in developing the economy. In Iran the private sector was involved in
Rafsanjani’s and Khatami’s period, as Rafsanjani allowed the private sector to invest and
state-owned industries were privatized and continued to privatize during Khatami’s
presidency. At the same time King Fahd allowed the private sector to invest in the
industrial sector and provided generous funds to encourage investors. Private banking and
insurance companies were allowed to operate in Iran, while the banking industry in Saudi
shifted to become shareholding companies.
Third Time Frame
The word reform and liberation were vivid in both Saudi Arabia and Iran during
the era of King Abdullah and President Ahmadinejad. However, it was not treated in the
same manner. Ahmadinejad was elected president while these elections were under the
control of conservatives. He won the elections to be the new face of conservatives and
face the power of the free young Iranians who gained their freedom during Khatami’s
presidency. Iran’s policy is shaped by the Islamic Revolution and Iran’s strategic
interests. Iranian policy would be determined based on both the inspiration of the Islamic
Revolution and their strategic interests. On the other hand, King Abdullah is considered a
reformist himself and the leader of the moderate part of the Royal family. As much as
Saudi pro-reform activists gained attention from the moderate group of the Royal Family,
this attention escalated in another direction when calls for a day of rage were voiced. At
this point the balance between the Saudi religious institutions and Saudi Royal Family
was restored again to face the escalation of liberal power as their calls were beyond the
plans of the King’s type of reform to provide equal rights to all Saudis and to provide
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more civil political participation. The Saudi government policy has always maintained its
balance with religious institutions in other words the kingdom demanded the need of
development as much as it kept its balance towards the Ulema. President Rouhani, since
he arrived in office, was able to show more openness and changed the Iranian foreign
policy direction by accepting to negotiate with the P5+1 group.
At this point Saudi Arabia and Iran are back to acting as rivals on the level of
foreign policy in the Middle East. They would choose to support opposite positions in
major Middle East causes and in issues. After the rise of Shiites in the Iraqi government,
support was provided from Iran while the U.S. military still existed in Iraq to stabilize the
country. Saudi Arabia supported Iraqi Sunnis and stated that the support would continue
if the U.S. withdrawal would raise the issue of marginalizing Sunnis in Iraq. Saudi also
financially supported Sunni, Druze, and Christians in Lebanon as a political defense
tactic to face the Iranians’ support of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Even in the Palestinian case, Saudi chose to support Fatah to also face Iranian
support of Hamas in Palestine in order to lessen the Iranian effect in Palestine. Having the
U.S. as an ally to Saudi is also considered one of the points Iran has used in defining
action toward Saudi. The American presence in the GCC area caused changes in the
Iranian presidency by electing Ahmadinejad; it also provided Iran a reason to threaten
Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries to react if any harm would happen to Iran from any
of the U.S. military bases spread out in the GCC. With the escalation of sectarian
conflict, Saudi Arabia accused Iran of reinforcing the idea of exporting the Islamic
Revolution. During the previous period, King Fahd’s era, Saudi Arabia acted as the
mediator of the Middle East, and continued to support regional causes during Abdullah’s
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era. However, Saudi refused to mediate between Iran and the U.S. upon an Iranian
request to Saudi in 2007, while Saudi responded to Iran by requests related to the security
of the GCC.
Saudi Arabia considers Iran’s nuclear program as a threat since Saudi has poor
military capabilities, has no local expertize in nuclear manufacturing and technology, has
no nuclear resources, and has no experience in enriching uranium. Yet, in 2008 Saudi
Arabia along with the GCC announced a collaborative peaceful nuclear energy program
which was understood by the Iranians as a reaction to their own nuclear program since
the program is planned to be a cooperative program with the U.S. and the French.
The nuclear program put Iran under tremendous pressure from the international
community due to sanctions imposed on Iran. The U.S. sanctions on Iran during the
Ahmadinejad presidency era caused the appearance of more Iranian radicals. The
radicalized Iranians did not stop the U.S. and CISADA from imposing more sanctions on
Iran in their efforts to attract Iran to peaceful negotiations. Throughout the history of U.S.
sanctions on Iran, Iran made no progress in comparison to the one made in 2013. Rouhani
agreed to meet with P5+1 to negotiate and rescue Iran from sanctions. On the other hand,
the Iranian nuclear program is considered a threat for the Saudi regional power and
especially in the Gulf region. It is also a Saudi fear due to its limited capabilities to own
and develop its own nuclear program, as mentioned above.
The populations of Saudi Arabia and Iran are educated and are considered the
appropriate manpower. In Iran they are a solid foundation for non-energy fields, while
the Saudis meet international education standards and lack professionals in the field of
nuclear power. Annually Iran faces the issue of providing jobs for 700,000 job seekers
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while it is only able to secure 300,000 to 500,000 jobs and poverty rates continued to
drop in Iran. In contrast, Saudi Arabia faces a range of 534,000 job seekers every year
with an unemployment rate of 12% in 2013.
Iran faced additional sanction that hurt its economy by reaching a 50% decrease
in Iran’s oil revenues in 2012, even though Iran tried to escape the effect of sanctions by
exporting to the East. Sanctions on Iran were due to its nuclear activity and unwillingness
to negotiate to find a resolution, while the Saudi oil revenues were growing. However,
the Kingdom is facing other threats in relation to the global oil industry as Iraqi oil
production increased, and new oil reservoirs in North America are discovered. In
addition, Saudi is facing the dilemma of uncontrolled usage of oil on energy.
Iran continued to work on their nuclear program until the P5+1 agreement in 2013
and 2014. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is considering starting a renewable nuclear energy
program to reduce the usage of oil to meet the domestic energy requirements.
The Arab Spring
According to critics, both Iran and Saudi Arabia acted as rivals during the Arab
Spring revolutions. Iran took the position of supporting all revolutions except Syria,
failing to consider calls of social and economic reform thus fueling the causes of these
revolutions. Iran viewed the social uprising as an extension of the Islamic Revolution,
even though the revolutions were not even lead by religious parties. Further, all the Arab
uprisings were social, and were met with Iranian support; the case in Syria is different
due to the fact of regional strategic interest. Iran would empower the Syrian ally to
protect the triangle of Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. The Saudi position, in contrast, varied
depending on the situation of each country and Saudi’s obligations towards it. Saudi
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Arabia supported all revolutions, except the one in Bahrain as GCC responsibilities
require Saudi to get involved in supporting the Bahraini government. On the other hand,
Saudi would protect its own soil from any Iranian attacks in the future, and that would
only be possible if the Bahraini opposition succeeds in Bahrain.
According to Iranian statements, the government viewed the revolutions as
extensions of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and a sign of the U.S. policy in the Middle
East. In the Egyptian case, Iran supported the revolution as it is a failure of an Arab
government allied with Israel, and supported the new Morsi regime by providing
guidance on how rule an Islamic state. In Tunisia, the revolution was supported since the
position of support would not affect Iran’s strategic interests. The case of supporting
Libya did not go any further than Iranian governmental statements and humanitarian
relief during the revolution as the position of Iran with Syria does not meet the position of
NTC in Libya. Bahrain was also supported by Iran, and would have been a strategic
location for Iran to have more power and control in the GCC region, whereas the Syrian
case is not considered an extension of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and is rarely
mentioned in the Iranian news.
According to Saudi statements, the position Saudi Arabia took in the Arab Spring
was the same position Saudi Arabia took as a major power in the Middle East. In Egypt,
at first the Saudi position was understood to be pro-Mubarak, yet this position was clearly
changed and became pro-revolution, and the government provided financial support to
the Egyptian military. This financial support continued to be offered during Morsi’s
regime. However, critics believe that Morsi’s relations with Iran were the reason why he
was overthrown, and Saudi directly congratulated Sisi as the new Egyptian president and
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also provided financial support. The Saudi military intervention in Bahrain is reasoned as
a Saudi obligation to the GCC, while the position Saudi took with the Tunisian and
Yemeni presidents was reasoned to be taken to protect the people of these countries by
the banning of the Tunisian president from practicing all political actions and
communications during his stay in Saudi, and by reaching a diplomatic agreement with
the Yemeni president to step down. In Syria, it has not been officially announced that the
Saudi government supported the rebels in Syria financially, though the Saudi King
declared any Saudi involvement with the Syrian rebels will lead to punishment that might
reach as much as thirty years in jail.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Implications of the Study, and Conclusion
This chapter is aimed to offer the relevant conclusions and suggestions based on
the data provided in the study. Precisely this study offers a better understanding of the
conflict of hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran and its affects from being a unified
power in the Middle East. This understanding of the continuous conflict is based on an
analysis of the historical relations and political exchange between both countries, as well
as tracking the changes and their effects on this relation. The focus of the analysis was to
use a qualitative method to create themes from the codes found in the data, and then to
connect them in order to grasp a meaning from the text. The analysis showed cause and
effect actions, as well as similarities that can be utilized as a common ground for the
bilateral relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This understanding suggests a shift in
this relation based on academic analysis of the political demeanor throughout the history
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The study examined the period from
1979 to the first quarter of 2014, as there were diplomatic efforts that took place to bridge
the differences between the two countries. The Saudi-Iranian relations have been
witnessing convergence and divergence in regards to geo-politics issues, and sometimes
required a severance of diplomatic relations.
Summary of Findings
Findings for this study were obtained from categorizing areas of investigation; the
researcher focused the inquiry efforts on the political systems of Iran and Saudi Arabia,
the economic position of each country, bilateral relations, and domestic and international
crises in which both countries were involved. First, it was discovered that the situation
between Iran and Saudi Arabia is based on caution and fear; the lack of trust between
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both countries is revealed obviously through the data. The perceptions regarding each
other depend on the actions taken by the other state; the data show that their exchange
behavior pattern is basically a reaction to which country makes the first move.
At the very beginning of the Islamic Republic of Iran, right after the 1979
revolution, Saudi Arabia waited for an action from Iran before showing its position
towards the new Iran. The wait-and-see policy was adopted by Saudi at the beginning of
the establishment of this relation and continued to be the policy used with Iran at most of
the times. Even though Saudi Arabia did not react immediately in the Iranian case and
rather waited to form a diplomatic position or gesture, the actions taken by Saudis were
not enough to establish a strong relationship with the new Iran.
Kind Saudi gestures were not enough, as Iran got involved in the local security of
Saudi by supporting the Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province of Saudi to ask for more
social freedom and equality, as well as during the Hajj riots. As much as these actions
acted as a security threat to Saudi, the Kingdom did not react directly to Iran using any
military action. The government of Saudi Arabia responded to these incidents as a local
matter and took action based on the category of them. Shiite demonstrations were
countered by reform and citizens’ demands were met in stages. However, riots during the
Hajj season were treated as security threats to the country and to the pilgrims performing
Hajj. A harsh and appropriate action was taken by the Saudi government in order to
restore order and peace quickly.
However, this was not the status of Saudi-Iranian relations in the past 35 years;
there were times where tensions eased. This was obviously noticed during the Rafsanjani
period, as Iran stopped accusing Saudi and the Royal Family, and it also stopped its
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support to the Shiites of Saudi Arabia. It not only ended the attacks on the Saudi
government, it went further in establishing stronger ties by establishing exchange
programs that included culture, sports, and business. These positive actions taken by the
Iranian government were responded to equally by the Saudis as Iranian Hajjis were
allowed once again to enter the Kingdom in other times not limited to the Hajj season. An
agreement of eleven points was signed between Saudi and Iran, and this exemplifies the
steady and strong political relations they can enjoy. However, the limitations put on any
Iranian president by the IRGC would result in restraint in any peacebuilding efforts.
The presidency of Ahmadinejad was geared towards the Revolutionary Guards,
and this was the cause of tension and cautions controlling the political relation between
both countries. During the Arab Spring when Ahmadinejad was still in office, the Saudis
and Iranians took a rivalry position in relation to these uprisings. The support Iran offered
to Morsi and Syria, and the support Saudi offered to Sisi were illustrative in this situation.
The opposite support positions to existing and new governments were based on strategic
interests, security, and hegemony. Even though, their statements of support were not to
prove this interest, both Saudi and Iran exposed their support in a diplomatic manner by
choosing politically correct statements. However, the current president Rouhani appears
to be more open to the world; this is vividly observed through his agreement to negotiate
with the P5+1 powers and take action in regards to their agreement. The Saudi relations
with the U.S. was the main issue standing in between them in resolving the conflict; the
new approach of Iran towards the West shows a major change in their foreign policy.
During the severance of Saudi-Iranian political relations, both states worked on
developing opposing allies within the region. Saudi Arabia initiated the idea of the GCC,
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and Iran took a different direction by allying with Syria and Hezbollah to strengthen its
position in the Middle East. They were seeking security, empowerment, and hegemony
by allying with influential states and political parties in the region. Popularity also was
pursued and gained via the cases each one of them have supported and actually worked
towards resolving regional conflict, such as the Iranian support of Hezbollah and the
appraisal they gained after freeing Lebanon from the Israeli occupation. In contrast, the
Saudi government also gained popularity through mediating in regional conflicts such as
the situation of isolating Egypt and the Lebanese governmental conflict. Yet, this was not
the situation during the Iraqi war on Kuwait; Iran took a different position and supported
Kuwait as this support would be understood as support to Saudi since Kuwait and Saudi
were in the same situation and facing a war with Saddam. Furthermore, Iran might have
chosen this position to retaliate against Iraq; it could have chosen a neutral position
instead of supporting neither side in this conflict. Strategic interests are the motivators of
Saudi and Iran at the stage of forming political bilateral relations and allies.
In addition, the policy of Iran and Saudi Arabia influenced the population of both
countries and enhanced their uncertainty about each other. During the worst period of the
bilateral relation, excessive and harsh actions were taken such as hatred speeches and the
use of clergies to spread sectarian conflict between the people of Iran and Saudi Arabia.
These hatred activities directed the citizens to engage in riots and demonstrations in
Saudi Arabia by Saudis and Iranians. Ideology was the card used and played by religious
figures to widen the gap between the people of Saudi and Iran, in a way to support the
cautious policy adopted. Based upon the data, it is evenhanded to contemplate that Saudi
and Iran did not want to get politically nor socially involved in emphasizing an
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affirmative relation. On the social level data show that the ban on airlines of each country
when ties were cut was a sign forbidding citizens from culturally and socially engaging
with each other, which results in negative feelings that people hold against each other.
The lack of connectivity in the Saudi and Iranian experience evolves into uncertainty and
ignorance of the culture and humanity of the people. Saudis and the citizens of the GCC
enjoy strong ties and relations that reach to marriages and business cooperation, yet this
is not the case between Saudis and Iranians. The only interaction between Saudis and
Iranians happens during the visit of Iranians to Saudi to perform Hajj, which is not
enough to build trust and knowledge about their cultures and mutual social concepts.
While the channels of culture exchange through travel are not utilized, the internet and
social media might serve as a tool of culture exchange. However, when examining the
political and social relation between Saudi and Iran, it is considered a negative trait.
Interpretation of Findings
All in all, the findings suggest some interesting angles to consider. Strategic
interests are the core cause of this conflict; in fact, ideological conflict was part of the
mechanism of the Iranian and Saudi strategic interests. The fear of spreading the ideology
of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and the spread of Saudi Sunni ideology that favors
relations with the West and the U.S. were blocking these two nations from acting as a
unified, powerful player in the Middle East. This appears throughout the history of their
relations and actions during the period examined from 1979 to 2014. However, the
current change in the Iranian foreign policy under the presidency of Rouhani shows a
pivotal change that has to be considered. This dramatic shift should be understood by the
Saudi government as a chance to be well-thought-out to connect with Iran on many
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levels. Diplomatic efforts and more attention should be brought to the current situation; it
is recommended that Saudi Arabia take the initiative to get across the past barriers and
meet with the new Iranian administration. An invitation to Iran to visit Saudi and discuss
future plans would be considered more than a kind gesture. Iranians are experts in the
nuclear field, while Saudis lack the knowledge and expertise. A nuclear knowledge and
expertise exchange program can be established between both governments. If executed
successfully, the Saudi-Iranian relations will reach its strongest level in history. Nuclear
is a security concept to Iranians, and lately they have negotiated with the West and agreed
to terms in relation to their nuclear program in order to lift sanctions on Iran and
ameliorate their economy. If a nuclear program is agreed upon, economic exchange
programs can be added to the agreement in a further stage. In the past during King Fahd’s
reign, Saudi and Iran were able to meet and agree on economic, security, and social
agreements. However, these agreements never included a nuclear agreement as it played
out as a key concept of conflict between both states in the past and a security threat to
Saudi.
The findings indicate the readiness and acceptance of both Iran and Saudi Arabia
to reconnect. A move from Saudi towards Iran to close the gap should be made. As the
data clarify, a kind gesture from the Kingdom would not be enough. If history is taken as
a cue, that which happened with King Khalid at the beginning the Republic of Iran was
not enough to build trust. It was not accepted as a gesture to build a steady relation, as the
Khomeini ideology was against the Saudi Royal family. However, after the Khomeini
period relations were built gradually. Rouhani, the current Iranian president, illustrates a
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new face for Iran. As much as Rafsanjani and Khatami were considered liberal
presidents, ties with the West were never established as they are in the present time.
The conflict between Saudi and Iran is not only between the governments; it also
reached the people of both countries making the conflict even harder to defuse and tackle
from all sides. Clergies in Saudi and Iran were exploited to broaden the concept of
sectarian conflict. The degree of hatred towards each other is enormous, and this can be
solved progressively. Resolving this sectarian conflict reached by clergies should be
managed on two different levels: clergies should be warned by the government to not
engage in escalating hatred, and programs that target the population of Iran and Saudi
Arabia should be formed.
Both citizens of Iran and Saudi Arabia should be exposed to each other on the
human level by the use of social media, entertainment, and culture exchange programs.
Social media was the tool that encouraged and coordinated the Arab Spring. Through
social media clergies are able to spread hatred and boost the sectarian conflict. Therefore,
governments should get engaged in indirect programs to effectively educate the masses
through such tools. Media and entertainment can also be used, benefiting from TV shows
and series.
The Turkish culture was introduced to the Middle East by a Turkish series dubbed
into Arabic; in a short time these shows abridged efforts that may have been taken years
in order to make the Turkish culture and social life so familiar to Arabs. According to
Aldulaimi (2010), the cross culture programs and exchange of knowledge between
communities is essential to the development and growth of these communities, and
openness of countries towards each other has multiple advantages in contributing to the
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creation of an atmosphere of cooperation. Exchange of cultural can boost the exchange of
knowledge, trade, and industry. Media is the most important means of cultural exchange
and knowledge among countries. Satellite channels started to present Turkish series on
Arab screens in 2006. As with any new drama the percentage of views at the beginning
was lower in comparison to Arabian dramas. However, the pace accelerated remarkably
and the number of viewers skyrocketed to reach high percentages. According to data
from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of Turkey, the number of Arab tourists who
entered Turkey in 2013 rose 9% compared to the percentage of 2012. The number of
Arab tourists visiting Turkey from 2011 to 2013 witnessed a steady growth, as many
Arab tourists changed their holiday vacation destination from Europe to Turkey; all this
came as a result of the impact of the Turkish series broadcast (Karasu, 2014). The
researcher finds that it would be a very clever move if taken by both Saudi and Iran to
introduce each country’s day-to-day life to each other through the art of media. This will
result in exchange visit between Iranians and Saudis; these simple efforts will improve
the understanding of each other through reflecting the simple life and social norms of
each other. In addition to the indirect effect of media and social media, the ministry of
higher education of Saudi and Iran can form an agreement for research cooperation. This
cooperation will help in exchanging the knowledge of scholars between both countries
and bring them closer. Students may be part of this cooperation by attending conferences
and being a part of these research teams.
As much as bringing the citizens of Iran and Saudi close to one another, the Saudi
Shiites should also be considered. The current King has paid attention to their matters,
and Shiites reached ministerial levels and members of the Shoura Council. These
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legislative positions are highly ranked and prestigious. Saudis that are appointed to these
positions must be trustworthy as they are considered part of the government. This is a
major advancement to gain the loyalty of the Saudi Shiites in the Kingdom. However,
demonstrations in the Eastern Province still happen, and the Province is always
monitored by the government to control the security of the area. The scholarship program
that started in 2005 as part of King Abdulla’s educational reform program did not
discriminate against Shiites and offered equal opportunities to study abroad by the Saudi
Ministry of Higher Education. This young educated generation has lived with Saudi
Sunnis outside the country. During their educational journey gaps were closed and they
were considered Saudis amongst each other. Even though sectarian conflict was not fully
resolved, friendship between young Sunnis and Shiites were gained. Friendship is a proof
that peacebuilding and resolution of sectarian conflict may be accomplished through
exploitation of the lifestyles of one another.
Context of Findings
The data collected and analyzed from the case study mainly revolves around the
subject of nuclear anxiety is a major issue to the security of Saudi Arabia. Moreover,
Saudi Arabia is forced to make a decision in this matter. The pattern Saudi followed in
the past was based on relying on a powerful state not from the region; this ally has always
been the United States. Saudi Arabia avoided making political decisions while taking
quiet petro-diplomacy decisions (Wehery, 2012). This was the pattern of Saudi Arabia
towards Iran’s nuclear program which it continues to adopt even though historical
noteworthy changes have had happened within the Iranian foreign policy.
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The policy Saudi Arabia has been adopting for a long time in regards to Iran has
never changed; aggressiveness towards Iran by the use of political actions and decisions
is not the pattern Saudi is practicing in this case. Saudi might have opinions about Iran
exposed only behind closed doors; these opinions will not be the Saudi behavior in public
and the U.S. must acknowledge this fact (Terrill, 2011). As the Saudi government plays
as a regional power in the Middle East, this position pressures Saudi to consider all their
diplomatic efforts to comply with their strategic interests. Based on this behavioral
pattern and strategic position, the findings direct the Saudi government to take the
initiative and move forward in building steady ties with Iran in the near future.
Examining the bilateral relation between Iran and Saudi Arabia since the 1979
Islamic Revolution to 2011, and understanding the pattern of political exchange between
them of decline and incline, the possibility of rescuing this bilateral relation through
cooperative liaison is high. Succeeding in embracing a positive, proactive approach
mutually, by launching measures of cooperation, can rescue the situation of conflict,
enhance reliance, and create a firm path of joint policies that will be beneficiary for both
states. Also in the findings of the same research, the authors believe in the need for Saudi
and Iran to understand the indecency, identity, essential foundations, and characteristics
of one another, and their national interests (Sadeghi & Ahmadian, 2011). In the findings
of this research, the researcher found that Saudi and Iran are witnessing geopolitical
changes within the region and political advancements on the Iranian foreign policy.
Exchange programs have been recommended to regain trust and collaboration; it was
stated above that Saudi should start the initiative of association, and this is noted for two
reasons. The first is that it is evident through an earlier diplomatic gesture that a kind
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gesture from King Khalid in recognition of the new Iranian state was not accepted and
was responded to harshly. The second reason is the policy King Fahd took working
proactively with Khatami in forming an eleven point agreement. For the governments to
understand the identity of each other, more has to be well-thought-out. Saudi Arabia or
Iran do not want to face an opposition movement in their countries due to allying. This
also has to be accomplished by the people of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The researcher found
that strict measures on clergies should be enacted to ban any discriminatory activity or
statements, media should be used to bring the nature and structure of both countries
closer, and an academic research based agreement should be formed between ministries
of higher education.
Implications of Findings
This study has enriched the field’s knowledge of the nature of the pattern of the
Saudi-Iranian relation. Precisely, this research considers the new updates to this matter;
constant research is needed as this topic represents a continuous conflict and changes
occur to shift the dynamic of the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The findings of
this research are in accordance with the theoretical framework mentioned and discussed
in the literature review chapter and reflected on to further understand the data. Much like
the data provided on the behavior of Saudi and Iran within the international community to
remain in power, the neorealism theory implies that the structure of international power is
a key reason of states to pursue power. In addition, the nonexistence of an authoritative
power that acts as a greater power among the rest and the nonexistence of security will
produce worries and uncertainties of security attacks from other states. This endeavor for
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power between countries and the worry of any future attack sets them up in a trap of
competition in order to obtain security and insure survival (Waltz, 1979).
According to the data provided, both Iran’s and Saudi’s foreign policy parallel the
notion of neorealism. In seeking security, Saudi Arabia chose to ally with the United
States and adopted a long term foreign policy to ensure this alliance. The Kingdom faced
domestic objection from religious figures and extremists due to this strategic decision.
However, Saudi maintained its position and never changed it, even during the early 1990s
when U.S. troops entered the country to defend Saudi against Iraq; the government was
supported by the Ulema to save its face from domestic rejection. The alliance with the
Americans is understood as having an authoritative power that will be able to secure the
Kingdom from any security threat. Saudi Arabia made tremendous efforts to pave the
way for this bilateral relation to last, while Saudi also continues to ally with regional
states that are allies with the U.S. to powerfully position itself. On the other hand, Iran
allies with Russia, even though their constitution conflicts with this tie. However,
strategic interest is the main reason of this diplomatic relation to continue. Iran
disregarded any attention to its contradictory policy and chose to maintain it to ensure
their security, allying with a powerful state such as Russia. Similar to Saudi, Iran also
allies with states that choose Russia as an authoritative power such as Syria to broaden its
regional spectrum and power, and insure its security.
According to neorealism, the resemblance in culture and government type does
not rule or control this political bond; these differences are not what shape this relation.
Neorealism explains it by the equality of states; however, power is the differentiating
factor. Power among states is identified by material capabilities and latent power
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(Mearsheimer, 2006). Saudi Arabia is one of the largest oil producers in the world, and
according to theory it meets the standards of wealth that the U.S. will accept to
continue—on the wish of the Saudi government— to have a long term political
relationship. However, Iran is a nuclear state and one of the world’s largest oil producers;
nuclear capabilities and oil production shape the reasoning behind the Iranian-Russian
relations.
The second theory mentioned in the theoretical framework discussion was
idealism in international relations. The concept of this theory revolves around
establishing a political system for a country based on ethics (Brown, 1992). War is not an
option according to this theory, since the expenses of war exceed the benefits behind it.
Religion conceptualizes ethics and morality, and the validity of Iran and Saudi Arabia is
gained through this morality. The Sunnis’ ideology is Saudi and Shiite one in Iran and
relies on the justification of domestic and international policies. When King Abdulaziz
established the Kingdom, the Ulema was consulted on political and social topics, as all
Saudi Kings followed the same practice. The consultation of Ulema was witnessed
throughout the history of the country.
As for the second concept of idealism in international relations, Saudi Arabia does
not favor the state of war and hostility. This appears in its mediation roles and
interventions with other states in the region to peacefully gain order. The Arab Spring
and King Fahd’s era were the best times to record this position adopted by the Saudis.
Furthermore, Iran’s constitution since the Iranian president’s power is limited and
controlled by the authority of the Supreme Leader whose position stands for religion. The
limitations on the Iranian president only leave him with the power to supervise the
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application of the constitution on the executive branch, while the Supreme Leader is in
control of armed forces, security, defense, and key foreign policy matters. In theory this
political approach taken by Iran is consistent with the understanding of idealism in
international relations in applying ethics to building a nation. Although Iran views Saudi
Arabia as its main rival in the Middle East, they never got involved in a war using
military power. Moreover, the demonstrations during King Khalid’s reign that were
supported by the Iranian government were not a war but were social uprisings to gain
equal rights for the Saudi Shiites, despite the fact that the demonstrations which happened
at the time of King Abdullah were not proven to be supported by Iran even though Saudi
political critics accused Iran of such.
The third theory chosen to explain the policy of Iran in Saudi Arabia was soft
power; the connotation of this theory distinguishing the efforts made by states makes
other states desire the same goals they believe in or that will meet their strategic interests
(Nye, 2004). This policy does not use power to change the direction of other states; it
uses attraction and persuasion as an approach. This theory not only reflects the good will
of states, it can also be used in negative influence. Soft power relies on the culture of a
state and its places that might attract other states, such as the international or local
policies that a state adopts, and the validity of a state’s foreign policy (Nye, 2011).
For example, Iran uses soft power in allying with Hezbollah. The attraction Iran
used with Hezbollah is the Shiite ideology which Iran practices; it also attracts them by
the Iranian support of the Palestinian case and supports Hezbollah financially in this
regard. Iran through Hezbollah was able to grab regional attention and support after the
withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the southern part of Lebanon. It also appears when
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Iran fully supported Morsi, the Egyptian president, and offered its guidance to provide
knowledge to Morsi’s administration in how to build an Islamic state.
Corresponding to Iran’s application of soft power, Saudi Arabia is able to attract
other states within the region due its religious position of hosting the two Holy Mosques.
Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring supported Egypt financially to reconstitute their
country and empower them during their worst times. The kingdom was also able to
attract the Gulf states by initiating the GCC to stand as a unified power in facing any
threat. These two examples of Saudi Arabian policy demonstrate the use of soft power in
gaining their goals through the attraction of other states.
Limitations
The study’s limitations arise from the enormous amount of data the researcher had
to go through and choose from. The period of the examined conflict was from 1979 to
2014; the reader had to recognize the needed data and extract it from a pool of
information. At the planning stage of this dissertation, the researcher chose to design a
method in extracting data. The researcher focused on pinpointing data related to the
foreign policy, local policy, economic status, and interactions between both Iran and
Saudi Arabia. This enabled to researcher to focus her mind and only concentrate her
thoughts on the conflict and its surroundings. During the analysis part, the researcher
used another design to cluster this bulk amount of information. She worked on dividing
the data into timeframes, instead of the layout used in the literature review; this layout
helped the researcher to deliberate on all the details and carefully pay attention to the
actions taken. Timeframes allowed the researcher to analyze the data and determine
periods of progressive practice between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These clusters of periods
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directed the efforts of the researcher to discover the findings proposed in this study to be
practiced in the near future.
Future Avenues of Research
Further research must concern the topic of conflict between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. The findings of this research provide possible solutions; however, it raises more
questions. To illustrate this statement, the application of a Saudi-Iranian nuclear
agreement would need more studies to create a fully detailed program to be applied, in
order to explore the possibilities of applying this recommendation. An agreement on a
nuclear program is a major action, and because this topic has been considered a threat,
providing research on the program itself would provide the needed data to have a wellstructured program for proposal while insuring the strategic interests of both states as
well as security. Iran and Saudi Arabia had previously signed an agreement of trade, ,
security, social, and culture exchange, yet such a sensitive topic was not agreed upon.
Accordingly, a study that examines such a political transition would be instructive and
likely noteworthy, since this research suggests a Saudi-Iranian security partnership.
There is also a possible threat from the public perception of presenting Iranian
drama broadcasts to Saudis views, and the opposite in Iran is also a probability. Thus,
research is needed to address the psychological effect of presenting such drama to the
people of Iran and Saudi. The shows and the timing of their broadcast should not be
randomly chosen. Moreover, many other factors should be considered in a detailed
research to present the recommendation as a solution and avoid the creation of more
sectarian conflict.
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Final Reflections and Conclusion
Explicit historical exchange signifies great prospects in further evolving and
understanding the nature of the behavior of both states. This research intended to
expound upon a relevant research topic; however, the researcher sought to investigate the
current developments and grasp valid findings to resolve the conflict between Saudi
Arabia and Iran both politically and socially to examine their roles as positive factors in
the Middle East. The important goal of resolving the issue from a social point is to
provide governments with the suitable support of their own people to peacefully
strengthen this tensioned relation. Many scholars have researched this topic on a
diplomatic level; the originality of this research emanates from combining social and
political factors in the findings. The researcher argues the importance of reaching out to
the citizens of both countries in accordance with diplomatic efforts, to achieve the
ultimate goal of this research in resolving the Saudi-Iranian conflict and benefiting from
these two powerful states in stabilizing the Middle East. The objective of forming a
cultural exchange program through media, for example, is not limited to removing the
ban of social disengagement between the people of Iran and Saudi Arabia or neutralizing
their points of view. It is to enrich thought, establish the value of tolerance among people,
pave the way for fruitful cooperation with returns on all parties, and search for common
denominators that form the constructive bedrock cooperation between nations and
people. The significance of these proposed resolutions stems from Islamic teachings as
stated in the Qur’an: “The believers are naught else than brothers. Therefore make peace
between your brethren and observe your duty to Allah that aptly ye may obtain mercy.”
Quran (49:10).
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Both countries are Islamic states that believe in the concept of peace and
brotherhood, and that hatred and discrimination is against the peaceful practices of Islam.
Reflecting on this Islamic practice, Iran and Saudi Arabia have to agree on cooperating in
a peacebuilding program as recommended in this research to indirectly embrace a
transformation through acceptance of their different cultural backgrounds.
Moreover,

neither

social

exchange

nor

political

alliance

will

work

unaccompanied; efforts on both levels must be exerted equally to support the process of
building peace in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran have a substantial role in
restoring stability to the region in liaising and collaborating instead of acting as rivals; it
has been noted that ties have been constructed between Iran and Saudi, and the near
future is the superlative chance to reconnect on many levels. This research will contribute
to the field of conflict analysis by offering a peaceful resolution to a political conflict that
has been progressing for decades. The emphasis of this peaceful resolution stems from its
potential to facilitate an end to the conflict by proposing a political and social solution;
both elements must be combined to reach the ultimate goal. Many scholars have proposed
solutions to the Saudi-Iranian conflict; however, analyzing the different factors integrated
in this case from a conflict resolution point of view provided a combined political and
social plan to gradually and peacefully end this conflict and strengthen the bilateral
relation.
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